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Fritsch, Peter T. M.S., May 2004 Environmental Sciences
An Examination of Mining In Wilderness, Logically Incompatible Yet Legally 
Feasible, Revisiting the Cabinet Mountains Mining Controversy
Advisor: Len Broberg
This paper is an examination of legal issues sun ounding the existence o f  mining in 
federally designated wilderness. Couching the issue in the “logical incompatibility” 
of the wilderness concept, as it is set forth in law, and the impacts o f mining as 
practiced today, this paper analyzes the legal precepts allowing for the contradictions 
to persist. Statutory, regulatory and judicial analysis reveals that, aside from 
reasonable regulation of operation and access, mining interests with valid existing 
rights either gained during the 1964 Wilderness Act exploration period or prior to the 
designation of subsequent wilderness have a strong argument supporting development 
o f their mining claims.
The twenty-year histoiy o f  the Rock Creek Mine controversy in the Cabinet 
Mountains Wilderness o f  Northwest Montana is a case study o f  valid rights gained 
during the exploration window period. Using the analysis o f the Wilderness Act 
itself, regulations promulgated to manage and enforce the Act’s tenets, judicial 
decisions handed down over the past four decades, as well as the Rock Creek Mine’s 
progress towards full operation, various options for reforming the Wilderness Act to 
better protect against mining are discussed.
A promising option to resolve the issue o f “valid existing rights” in wilderness, and 
the takings issues surrounding their elimination is through a minor amendment to the 
Wilderness Act allowing agencies to use eminent domain to buy out those rights. 
Currently, the USFS is specifically barred from use of the eminent domain power to 
protect wilderness. Blended into the NEPA process, eminent domain would be just 
one o f  many management tools available to the agencies, currently unavailable, that 
might prove most effective in dealing with controversial mining proposals in areas of 
high wilderness value.
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I. Introduction
To many o f  us in America, the Wilderness Act represents the penultimate in
the country’s conservation efforts in the 20"  ̂century. Aldo Leopold, the legendary
conservationist stated:
“All ethics so far evolved rest upon a simple premise, the individual is a 
member o f a community of interdependent parts.. .The land ethic simply 
enlarges the boundaries o f the community to include soils, waters, plants and 
animals, or collectively; the land... A land ethic o f  course cannot prevent the 
alteration, management, and use o f  these resources, but it does affirm their 
right to continued existence, and, at least in spots, their continued existence in 
a natural state”.’
Written only a handful o f years before the beginning o f  the “wilderness debate”, 
Leopold’s statements represent a new justification for wilderness preservation, 
lowering us from our dominant status to one of co-inhabitor with the natural 
community." Long before the “wilderness debate” began, Henry David Thoreau, the 
famous wilderness traveler and philosopher o f the 19”’ century, wrote: “In wildness is 
the preservation o f the World” .̂  Thoreau, through his works, was the embodiment of 
the wilderness concept. He sought to interact with the wilds on its own terms, to 
appreciate it for all its beauty and brutality, and to leave it as he found it.
The original purpose o f the Wilderness Act was simple and pure: to establish 
a National Wilderness Preservation System composed of federally owned areas 
designated by Congress as “wilderness areas” . These areas were to be administered 
for the use and enjoyment o f  the American people in such a manner as will leave 
them unimpaired for future use and enjoyment as wilderness, provide adequate
‘ Aldo Leopold, A Sand  County A lnuum c, p. 203-4. ( 1949).
- Daniel Rob If & Douglas Honnold, M anaging the Balances o f  Nature: The Legal Fram ework o f  
W ilderness M anagem ent, 15 Ecology L.Q. 249, 254 (1988).
Henry David Thoreau, “W alking” , in The Portable Thoreau 609 (C. Bode ed. 1947).
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protection for these areas and their wilderness character, and for the gathering and 
dissemination o f  information regarding their use and enjoyment as wilderness/
This clear and concise purpose was complicated, however, by another section 
in the Wilderness Act, one allowing for access to valid mining and grazing claims or 
other valid occupancies, including access to private land surrounded by wilderness/ 
An argument could be made against the existence of this portion o f  the act. It 
grandfathers incompatible activities in wilderness, so its continued presence is 
seemingly illogical. The activities allowed by this portion o f  the Act seriously 
degrade the level of protection afforded to designated wilderness areas. Lastly, this 
portion o f  the Act is directly contradictory to the purpose behind the Act as stated, in 
rather unequivocal temis, in the first section o f  the Act.^
One must be sympathetic, however, to the political reality in which the 
Wilderness Act was bom. The date o f the Wilderness Act’s enactment, 1964, 
predates the “green revolution” by several years, and the debate over the Act’s 
passage really began eight years earlier, in 1956. The Wilderness Act represented, in 
many ways, America’s first step towards a preservationist ethic. While it is 
disappointing to find numerous compromises made for resource extraction interests 
and private access within the Wilderness Act, these concessions allowed the Act to 
survive the contentious political process surrounding its passage and become law.
This paper, while willing to admit these concessions were necessaiy in order 
to effect passage o f the Act in 1964, contends the continued existence o f  these 
concessions, and the mining concession in particular, are a time bomb waiting for the
" 16 u s e  § 1 131(a).
'  16 u s e  ÿ 1134.
" 16 u s e  § 1 131(a) & (c ) .
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first legal precedent to open the door to a rush on the natural resources held within 
our nation’s Wilderness Preservation System. It is a central tenet o f  this paper that 
the concessions made for the mining industry must be removed from the Wilderness 
Act through amendment at best, or, at least, effectively neutralized through agency 
rulemaking and action, combined with effective court challenges by those seeking to 
preserve the Wilderness A ct’s intended puipose. One caveat must be made, however, 
for wilderness created through the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act 
(ANILCA). Alaskan wilderness is governed by a different set o f  laws pertaining to 
wilderness mining and Alaskan wilderness contains far to much mineral wealth for 
the nation to disregard its importance for strategic mineral and fuel production.’
In order to support such a proposition, this paper will point out the specifics of 
the Act’s legislative shortcomings through an internal analysis o f  the Act’s inherent 
contradictions. Further, the difficulties presented by these inconsistencies will be 
highlighted through the case law and administrative policy promulgated in the last 40 
years intended to reconcile them and allow those charged with administering 
wilderness areas to do so with confidence that they are following the law. The paper 
will then focus in on the Cabinet Mountains Wilderness (CMW) in northwest 
Montana and the mining controversy there, an ongoing dispute for over twenty years 
now. This dispute highlights the Wilderness Act’s failure to protect the wilderness 
characteristics o f a designated wilderness area from significant degradation brought 
on by what will possibly be the largest silver/copper mine in U.S. history.
' John C. Hendee & Chad P. Dawson, W ilderness M unagenient, Pu. 546-47 (3"^ Ed, Revised 2002); 16 
u s e  3142-3150.
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Utilizing the results o f  the analyses above, the paper will then attempt to offer 
theoretical solutions in favor o f long-term preservation of our wilderness areas 
despite the ever-increasing pressure from resource extraction interests to develop 
them for their natural resources. While the Cabinet Mountains mining controversy 
represents the only immediate threat to wilderness posed by resource extraction, 
many valid, but currently unmarketable, wilderness mineral claims and leases loom in 
other wildernesses, waiting for the time when they will become profitable. Actual 
onsite mining use of natural forest wilderness appears rather limited at first glance, 
but mining claims are numerous -  just how numerous is hard to tell because, only in 
the last five years or so, has the Forest Service required notification for claims filed 
on national forest land.® As o f 1985, an important date as further discussion will 
reveal, there were at least 10,000 validly located mining claims in the National 
Wilderness Preservation System.'^ In the east, as o f 1984, 103 wildernesses out of 
192 contained private mineral rights covering nearly one million acres.'® Further, 
although operating under different laws than hardrock mineral extraction, it has been 
determined that 2.7 million acres o f  wilderness, mostly in western Montana, have a 
high probability o f containing significant oil and gas reserves."
Mining in wilderness represents an untenable contradiction in our public lands 
preservation law. The impacts from mining, while rather localized in comparison to 
other grandfathered uses of wilderness, can be the most devastating impacts man can 
infiict on the land. Mines can produce acid mine drainage and siltation leading to
 ̂ John C. Hendee, George H. Stankey & Robert C. Lucas, IVilderness M aiiageinenr, Pg. 360 (2"'  ̂ Ed. 
Revised 1990).
"  !d.
Id. at p. 113.
' ' Id. at p. 112.
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reduced water quality in streams and water bodies.*“ The negative social and 
ecological impacts o f  mining to wilderness conditions -  naturalness and wildness -  
are extensive.'^ Even old mines may continue to impact wilderness with their 
residual buildings, many of them eyesores and junk heaps, and roads that continue to 
erode while impacting access and use and which are often invitations to motorized 
trespass in wilderness.'"^
Some o f  the solutions posed by this paper will seem rather obvious, but the 
options available to resolve this problem are few. More important than the various 
solutions themselves is an analysis o f  the legal and political realities that will allow 
them to succeed or spell their impending doom, or worse yet, will turn an effort for 
positive refomi upside down and cause more harm than good.
II. History Behind the Act 
The genesis o f  the Wilderness Act took place with Minnesota Senator Hubert 
Humphrey's introduction o f  the Act’s first version in 1956.'^ Long before Senator 
Humphrey’s bill reached the Senate floor for a vote, debates raged within the Interior 
and Insular Affairs Committee regarding numerous issues, some specific and some 
overarching. Senator Humphrey’s pro-preservation bill stated: “no portion o f any 
area constituting a unit o f the National Wilderness Preservation System shall be 
devoted to . . .prospecting, mining or the removal o f  mineral deposits” .'^ Therefore, 
one could say Senator Humphrey and those who championed his wilderness bill
’ Supra Note 7 at p. 362,
"  Id. 
A/.
Senate Bill 4013, 84 ’ Congress ( 1956),
Senate Bill 1176, 85"’ Congress § 3(b) ( 1957).
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began in 1957 with legislation containing no compromise for private or commercial 
interests.
It did not take long for opposition to the wilderness bill to appear. The 
American Mining Congress (AMC) led the charge against the bill, stating it hurt both 
the mining industry and the nation as a w h o le .A m o n g s t  the many arguments 
against Senator Humphrey’s wilderness bill, the AMC argued the withdrawal o f  land 
from mineral exploration and extraction contradicted historical policies o f  free access 
to public lands.’® Additionally, the AMC felt the bill would abrogate their express 
rights under the General Mining Act o f  1872 to develop located or locatable mineral 
deposits into a patented property right.'^ The Forest Service joined with the AMC in 
finding the wilderness bill contradictory to traditional multiple use policies for the 
public l a n d s .F in a l ly ,  mining representatives effectively characterized the 
wilderness bill as a threat to economic development and national security, finding the 
bill would reduce the land available for mineral exploration/development and make 
the United States more dependent on imported minerals.’ ’
As the hearings process on Senate Bill 1176 came to a close. Senator 
Humphrey and others in favor o f  wilderness legislation began to realize mining 
interests were going to stand in their way, preventing any legislation that might close 
off their interests in the public lands. Those in favor of the wilderness bill began to
Christopher M. Klyza, IV/iu Conlrols Public LaiuLs'.^ M ining, Foresiry and  Gracing Policies 1870- 
/PPO, p. 38(1996).
M
National Wilderness Preservation Act: Hearings on Senate Bill 1176 Before the Commission on 
Interior and Insular Affairs, 85"’ Congress (1957).
■" Klyza, supra note 8, at 38. Donald Rohlf  & Douglas L. Honnold, M anaging  the Balances o f  Nature: 
The Legal F ram ew ork o f  W ilderness M anagem ent, 15 Ecology L.Q. 249, 257 ( 1988).
National Wilderness Preservation Act: Hearings on Senate Bill 1 176 Before the Commission on 
Interior and Insular Affairs, 85"’ Congress ( 1957).
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talk compromise, seeking to appease the mining interests and pass the bill, instead of 
failing to achieve any measure o f  protection for the public lands. As a result, the 
proposed bill backed off prohibiting all mining activities, and compromised to allow 
for “presidential exceptions”.'" The President could allow for location and mining in 
wilderness areas if it were determined the interests of the nation would be better 
served in doing so."^ Mining interests characterized this “Presidential exception” as 
meaningless because no incentive would exist for a locator o f  a mineral deposit to 
expend moneys in prospecting when no guarantee would exist entitling said locator to 
actually mine the deposit for profit.""^ As a result, the amended, or compromised bill 
was also stalled in committee by the mining industry.
In 1961, Senator Clinton Anderson proposed a new wilderness bill. Senate 
Bill 174, an almost identical bill to the one proposed earlier by Senator Humphrey."^
In July 1961, the Senate Bill 174 made it out o f the Committee on Interior and Insular 
Affairs with a report stating: “in view of the vast unexploited land areas o f the Nation 
that remain and the safeguards written into Senate Bill 174, the majority o f the 
committee does not feel that the mining industry will actually be injured by the 
bill” ."*̂ Although the debate on the floor over Senate Bill 174 was vigorous, the bill 
made it out o f  the Senate suecessfully and was passed on to the House of 
Representatives for debate and a final vote.
National Wilderness Preservation Act: Hearings on Senate Bill 4028 Before the Commission on 
Interior and Insular Affairs, 85''' Congress ( 1958).
Id.
Klyza, Supra note 8. at 40.
-  Senate Bill 174, 87"' Congress (1961). 
Klyza, Supra note 8, at 41.
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The Senate’s passage of Senate Bill 174 marked a switch in tactics by the 
mining opposition to the wilderness legislation. They began to think compromise as 
well, moving away from their previously entrenched position o f staunch opposition to 
any wilderness protection at all. When it appeared wilderness legislation was 
inevitable, mining interests sought exemptions from the law, stating wilderness 
protection and mining were not incompatible."^ As the bill moved through the house, 
the mining industry successfully influenced Congress to adopt a more friendly bill. 
House Bill 776, originally providing a ten-year exemption for mining within 
wilderness areas and then increasing the exemption to twenty-five years."® The bill 
also called for periodic “mineral reviews’’ o f wilderness areas to determine if  the 
wilderness designation was still warranted.'^ This prompted resistance from 
wilderness proponents who called the bill a “perversion of wilderness preservation” .̂  ̂
At the conclusion o f  the 87“' Congress, House Bill 776 failed to make it to a floor 
vote, making the passage o f Senate Bill 174 meaningless.
Finally, in 1963, Senate Bill 4, a new wilderness bill identical to Senate Bill 
174, passed a Senate floor vote by a large margin; a strong victory for wilderness 
advocates.'^' However, when the bill was presented to the House o f  Representatives, 
they passed their version o f  a wilderness bill. House Bill 9070. Unfortunately, House 
Bill 9070 differed from Senate Bill 4 in its inclusion o f  a twenty-year exemption for 
mining in wilderness areas, so the differences had to be reconciled in a joint-
Klyza, Supra note 8, at 42.
House Bill 776, 87"’ Congress (1962).
Klyza, Supra note 8, at 45.
Senate Bill 4, 88"’ Congress (1963).
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committee o f  senators and congressmen.^" The resulting hybrid version o f Senate 
Bill 4 and House Bill 9070 was the one to finally make it across the President’s desk 
and become law. As such, compromise provided the means for the Wilderness Act to 
become law. However, the compromises made crippled the Act, rendering it only 
marginally effective in long-term protection of wilderness against mining interests.
III. Analysis of the Wilderness Act’s Internal Contradictions
A. Statutoiy Analysis
The Wilderness Act, as it exists on the books today, is a very simple set of 
laws, comprised o f  only six relatively straightforward and simple statutes. As simple 
as it may seem, despite its streamlined appearance, the Act manages to possess 
disparaging inconsistencies within it, giving the Act the feel o f  a legislative 
dichotomy.
The stated legislative purpose for the Act is found in 16 USC § 1131(a). It 
prioritizes the protection o f certain federal and state lands designated by Congress as 
“wilderness areas” . Subsection (b) o f 1131 provides for the management o f the 
National Wilderness Preservation System; the appropriate managing agency for a 
given wilderness area is the agency previously administering the area prior to its 
wilderness designation. Subsection (c) o f  1131 provides the statutory definition of 
“wilderness” .
Both subsections (a) and (c) require more analysis as they represent “purpose” 
and overarching language spelling out just what wilderness is and what it will be used 
for. Subsection (a) constitutes very specific “purpose” language:
■ House Bill 9070, 8 8 '’ Congress ( 1963) & Klyza, Supra note 8, at 45.
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“(a) In order to assure that an increasing population, accompanied by 
expanding settlement and growing mechanization, does not occupy and  
modify all areas within the United States and its possessions, leaving no 
lands designated for preservation and protection in their natural condition, it is 
hereby declared to be the policy o f  the Congress to secure fo r  the American 
people ofpresen t and fu ture generations the benefits o f  an enduring 
resource o f  wilderness. For this purpose  there is hereby established a 
National Wilderness Preservation System to be composed o f  federally owned 
areas designated by Congress as "wilderness areas", and these shall be 
administered fo r  the use and enjoyment o f  the American people in such 
manner as will leave them unimpaired fo r  fu ture use and enjoyment as 
wilderness, and no Federal lands shall be designated as "wilderness areas" 
except as provided for in this Act or by a subsequent Act."^^
(Emphasis added)
This statute seems unequivocal. There is no mention of mining as a future use to be
secured. In fact, the only mention o f the word “resource” in this “purpose” language
is to qualify wilderness as the only resource this Act was meant to protect.
Subsection (c) differs from the above quoted subsection in that it purports to actually
define what wilderness is under the auspices o f  the Act:
(c) A wilderness, in contrast with those areas where man and his own works 
dom mate the landscape, is hereby recognized as an area where the earth and 
its community o f  life are untrammeled by man, where man him self is a 
visitor who does not remain. An area of wilderness is further defined to mean 
in this Act an area o f  undeveloped Federal land retaining its prim eval 
character and influence, without perm anent improvements or human 
habitation, which is protected and managed so as to preserve its natural 
conditions and which ( 1 ) generally appears to have been affected primarily 
by the forces o f  nature, with the imprint o f  man's work substantially 
unnoticeable; (2) has outstanding opportunities fo r  solitude or a prim itive  
and unconfined type o f  recreation-, (3) has at least five thousand acres o f  land 
or is o f  sufficient size as to make practicable its preservation and use in an 
unimpaired condition; and (4) may also contain ecological, geological, or 
other features o f  scientific, educational, scenic, or historical value.^^
The definition just given, o f  what wilderness is under this Act, contains no mention of
mining related activities. In fact, any such mining related activities could very easily
16 U SC  i? 1131(a).
16 USC sS 1131(c).
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be construed as directly contradictory to just about every aspect o f the wilderness 
definition given above. The only room for reconciliation might be the mention of 
geological features with scientific value. However, it is illogical to move from 
language supporting scientific research of unique and interesting geological features 
to claiming the language also supports large-scale resource extraction for profit in 
wilderness areas.
The second statute in the Wilderness Act begins by designating as “wilderness 
areas” all lands within the national forests previously administered as “wild”, 
“wilderness” or “canoe" prior to the passage o f  the Act.^^ Sub-section (a) of the 
statute 1132 also requires the Secretaiy o f  Agriculture to make public all records 
pertaining to a “wilderness area” upon its designation.^^ Subsection (b) o f statute 
1132 provides for another Forest Service category o f  wild lands known as “primitive 
areas”. Under subsection (b), Congress is supposed to review each “primitive area” 
to determine its suitability for designation as “wilderness areas” . Subsection (b) also 
requires a study to be done by the Forest Service, a report by the Secretary of 
Agriculture to the President, and presidential recommendation to Congress on each 
area.^^ Finally, subsection (b) provides for presidential expansion or alteration of the 
boundaries o f  such a re a s .S u b s e c t io n  (c) o f  statute 1132 allows for similar analysis 
for areas previously classified as “primitive”, located within roadless areas and under 
the jurisdiction of the Secretary o f the Interior. Subsection (d) o f  statute 1132 
provides for public notice requirements when designating a “wilderness area” under
16 USC § 1132(a).
16 USC ÿ 1 I32(a){l)&(2).
■ ' 16 USC ÿ 1 132(b).
■ " Id.
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this statute. Subsection (e) o f  statute 1132 requires the same public notice 
requirements be followed whenever an agency contemplates changing a “wilderness 
area” boundary.
Section 1133(a) states the Act’s purpose is within and supplemental to the 
purposes for which the national forests, national parks and national wildlife refuges 
are established and administered. Subsection (b) o f statute 1133 states the managing 
agency o f  the underlying jurisdiction will be charged with preserving the wilderness 
character o f a given wilderness area and shall administer the area accordingly. 
Subsection (c) o f  statute 1133 lists prohibited uses o f  “wilderness areas” including: no 
commercial enterprises; no pemianent roads; no use o f  motor vehicles, motorized 
equipment or motor boats; no landing o f  aircraft; and so on. Subsection (d) of statute 
1133 then sets forth several “special provisions”; this subsection represents most of 
the “compromise” found within the Wilderness Act.
Beginning with subsection (a), several subsections o f  16 USC § 1133 warrant 
close scrutiny. Subsection (a) complicates the policy mandates used by the agency 
personnel charged with managing a wilderness area. The subsection specifically 
states: “(a) The purposes o f this Act are hereby declared to be within and 
supplemental to the purposes for which national forests and units o f  the national park 
and national wildlife refuge systems are established and administered....” .̂  ̂ The 
subsection then goes on to enumerate the various enabling laws for the specific 
management agencies to be co-mingled with the Wilderness Act. While this concept 
o f  “within and supplemental” seems confusing, it works itself out rather simply.
Each agency is charged with creating plans for managing the lands under its
16 U.S.C. ÿ 1133(a).
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jurisdiction. This planning often takes place on multiple levels: national planning,
regional planning, and planning for individual management units, however they are
delineated. The agencies are then supposed to incorporate the tenets o f the
Wilderness Act into these plans if  there is a designated wilderness area within the
jurisdiction. The Wilderness Act is the primary guide for managing within the
wilderness area, not the overarching law designed to govern the actions o f the agency
itself. It is not always so cut and dried, but this is the general interaction between the
Wilderness Act and the various agencies’ enabling laws.
Subsection 1133(b) is a very important section o f  the Act. It goes a long way
towards debunking the purpose language and definitions o f  wilderness found earlier
in the Act. Specifically it states:
(b) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, each agency administering any 
area designated as wilderness shall be responsible for preserving the 
wilderness character o f  the area and shall so administer such area fo r  such 
other purposes fo r  which it may have been established as also to preserve its 
wilderness character. Except as otherwise provided in this Act, wilderness 
areas shall be devoted to the public purposes o f recreational, scenic, scientific, 
educational, conservation, and historical use.’’̂
The “exception” language in this section of the Act paves the way for the mining,
grazing and private access rights in wilderness. If it were not for this transitional,
“management” oriented language, the latter subsections in the Act, allowing for these
contravening uses within wilderness, would seem all the more out of place.
16 USC § 1133(c) outlines illegal activities within wilderness and gives the
agencies some latitude, or discretion, in enforcing the ban on those activities. This
latitude is also known as the “minimum tool” requirement. The clear intent o f  the Act
in this subsection is to permit administrators to carry out actions otherwise considered
16 U.S.C. i? 1133(b).
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inappropriate in wilderness if it becomes apparent these actions are necessary to 
manage the area as wilderness. It is significant to note the courts have, in part, used 
this provision of the Act to severely restrict access to valid mining claims within 
wilderness.^'
16 USC § 1133(d)(2)&(3) are the specific provisions so vehemently fought 
for by the mining industry in the course o f  the Wilderness A c f  s passage into law. 
Despite these provisions, the Wilderness Act still places additional restrictions hard- 
rock mining activities within national forest wilderness areas.^" Although wilderness 
areas remained open to exploratory mining activities until December 31, 1983, in 
reality, under subsection (d)(2), the location o f hard-rock claims in wilderness before 
1984, and, under subsection (d)(3), developing those valid claims after that date was 
hampered by restrictions."^^ Further, only if  you were able to fully locate and develop 
your claim prior to January 1, 1984, meeting the “marketability test” set forth through 
case law and based off the General Mining Law of 1872, would you truly be afforded 
any real protection by these pro-mining subsections.
These two subsections then allow the managing agencies to impose potentially 
crippling restrictions on these valid claims. Subsection (d)(2) put an end to all 
mineral prospecting with the passing o f  the New Year in 1983-4, so unless you had 
validly located your claim by said date, all rights you might have had therein were 
extinguished. Subsection (d)(3) then authorized the Secretary o f  Agriculture to 
impose surface restoration requirements and regulate ingress/egress from mining
d o u s e r  V. Espy. 42 F.3d 1522 (9“' Cir. 1994).
Kenneth Hubbard, Marily Nixon & Jeff  Smith, The W ilderness A c t's  Im pact on M ining Activities: 
Policv Versus Practice. 76 Den. U. L. Rev. 591, 599 ( 1999).
A/.
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da im s in order to protect the “wilderness character on the land” .'*'̂  Additionally, 
subsection (d)(3) imposes use restrictions on mining locations, limiting use o f the 
land solely to “mining or processing operations and uses reasonably incident 
thereto” . P a t e n t e d  mining rights within “wilderness areas” can also be altered to 
exclude the title to surface rights, a right typically enjoyed with a patented mining 
claim under the General Mining Act o f  1872.'^^ Essentially, after 1983, lands 
withdrawn from the operation o f mining laws under the Wilderness Act were no 
longer subject to only those laws. Despite the mining industry’s hard-fought battle to 
win exemptions for mining activities within “wilderness areas”, the issue just 
morphed into the extent to which regulatory agencies and courts would recognize 
those mining rights and the restrictions they might impose on them."*^
Unfortunately, as the Rock Creek mining proposal in the CMW illustrates, 
even with all these added protections and difficulties imposed on the mining interests, 
it is still possible for a mineral lode to be valuable enough to justify the added 
expenditures of time and money to mine in wilderness. Subsequent Wilderness Acts, 
each enacted to designate new wilderness areas into the NWPS, have dealt with the 
mining question in one o f  two ways based on the date the Act was made into law. All 
subsequent wilderness bills enacted before the original Wilderness Act’s December 
31, 1983 deadline for locating a valid mineral claim defer to said deadline. All 
subsequent wilderness bills enacted after the original deadline contain their own
!d.
Id.
Id.
Hubbard, Ni.xon & Smith, Supra Note 30, at 599-600.
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sunset clause referring to the bill’s date o f enactment as the closure date for locating 
new mining claims.
Additional statutory exceptions were made for water resource needs (both 
from water consumption and hydropower) and grazing interests seeking to maintain 
previously established grazing rights within “wilderness areas’’.'*̂  Finally, 
recreational services were accommodated as necessary for that purpose, as well as 
provisions respecting state jurisdiction regarding appropriative water rights and 
fish/wildlife protection.
The fourth section o f  the Wilderness Act deals with state and private lands 
located within and completely sunounded by a “wilderness area” .̂ ® This statute 
provides for the exchange o f  federal lands deemed to be o f  approximately equal value 
for state/private lands surrounded by a “wilderness area” . '̂ Subsection (b) o f  statute 
1134 provides for access to valid mining claims or other valid occupancies within a 
“wilderness area”. Subsection (c) o f  statute 1134 then authorizes the federal 
government to purchase private property provided the private or state owner agrees 
and Congress approves.
Section 1135 authorizes the Secretary o f  Agriculture to accept both gifts 
and/or bequests o f private land located within or adjacent to “wilderness areas”, and 
to accept o f  private contributions and gifts, other than land, so long as they are used to 
further the purposes o f  the Act.^‘ The final statute in the Wilderness Act is another 
reporting statute requiring the Secretaries of Agriculture and Interior to jointly report
16 U S C  ÿ 1133(d)(4).
16 u s e  § 1133(d)(5-7).  
•" 16 u s e  ÿ 1134(a).
16 u s e  § 1134(a).
16 u s e  § 1135.
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to the President, for transmission to Congress, on the status o f  the wilderness 
system.”
B. Regulatory Analysis
I. Forest Sei'\’ice
Agency regulations concerning wilderness management are rather detailed 
and, when recounted for each agency, would take up far too much space and time 
compared to their relative value to the ultimate goals o f  the paper. Accordingly, this 
discussion will focus in on “mining specific” wilderness regulations, policies and 
agendas taken by the various agencies commissioned with managing the country’s 
many wilderness areas.
Most o f the wilderness areas created by the 1964 Wilderness Act were located 
within the Forest Service jurisdiction.”  To begin the discussion on Forest Service 
policy towards mining activities within wilderness, one should look briefly at the 
overarching policies the Service has regarding wilderness. Two sections, the 
“Objectives” and “Policy” sections, are the most illuminating:
2320.2 - Objectives -  (some portions deleted)^^
1. Maintain and perpetuate the enduring resource of wilderness as one of the multiple uses of 
National Forest System land.
2. Maintain wilderness in such a manner that ecosystems are unaffected by human 
manipulation and influences so that plants and animals develop and respond to natural 
forces.
3. Minimize the impact of those kinds of uses and activities generally prohibited by the 
Wilderness Act, but specifically excepted by the Act or subsequent legislation,
4. Protect and perpetuate wilderness character and public values including, but not limited to, 
opportunities for scientific study, education, solitude, physical and mental challenge and 
stimulation, inspiration, and primitive recreation experiences.
- ' 16 USC ÿ 1136.
54
http:7www.\vi!deme.ss.net/inde.\.ct'm?fuse=NWPS&scc=\vildView&\ViD=12cytab=Public''(.20La\vs. 
”  http:.-'V\v\v\v.wilderness.net/index,ctm?fuse=N\VPS&sec=poiicyFS.
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
18
5. Gather information and carry out research in a manner compatible with preserving the 
wilderness environment to increase understanding of wilderness ecology, wilderness uses, 
management opportunities, and visitor behavior.
2320.3 - Policy -  (some portions deleted)'''^'
1 . Where there are alternatives among management decisions, wilderness values shall 
dominate over all other considerations except where limited by the Wilderness Act. 
subsequent legislation, or regulations.
2. Manage the use of other resources in wilderness in a manner compatible with wilderness 
resource management objectives.
3. In wildernesses where the establishing legislation permits resource uses and activities that are 
nonconforming exceptions to the definition of wilderness as described in the Wilderness Act, 
manage these nonconforming uses and activities in such a manner as to minimize their 
effect on the wilderness resource.
4. Cease uses and activities and remove existing structures not essential to the administration, 
protection, or management o f wilderness for wilderness purposes or not provided for in the 
establishing legislation.
5. Because wilderness does not exist in a vacuum, consider activities on both sides of 
wilderness boundaries during planning and articulate management goals and the blending of 
diverse resources in forest plans. Do not maintain buffer strips o f undeveloped wildland to 
provide an informal extension of wilderness. Do not maintain internal buffer zones that degrade 
wilderness values. Use the Recreation Opportunity Spectrum (FSM 2310} as a tool to plan 
adjacent land management.
6. Manage each wilderness as a total unit and coordinate management direction when they cross 
other administrative boundaries.
7. Whenever and wherever possible, acquire non-Federal lands located within wildernesses,
as well as non-Federal lands within those areas recommended for inclusion in the system.
With the notable exception found in both sections above concerning non-conforming, 
but specifically exempted uses within wilderness, such as mining, these regulations 
take on a very noticeably pro-preservation slant towards the wilderness resource. 
Given the dictates o f  both the Wilderness Act itself and then the overarching Forest 
Service policies above, one has to wonder how a mining operation would ever get 
approved within a wilderness area. The answer, as will be revealed in this paper’s 
discussion o f  the Rock Creek Mine approval in the CMW, lies within the auspices of 
“agency discretion” . “Agency discretion” could be described as the amount of wiggle 
room, or leeway, an agency decision-maker has within the mandates controlling 
his/her actions, as they are found in statutes, regulations, and agency policies.
hi
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Having laid out the overarching regulations guiding the Forest Service’s 
management of wilderness areas, it is now time for a closer look at the regulations 
guiding the Service’s treatment o f potential mining claims in wilderness. The Forest 
Service explains its authority for managing mineral extraction in wilderness in the 
following way:
572323.7 - Management of Minerals and Mineral Materials
2323.71 - Authority. Section 4(d)(2) of the Wilderness Act authorizes activity for the purpose of 
gathering information about mineral resources. Section 4(d)(3) authorizes mineral exploration and 
development operations only where there are valid existing rights. Subsequent acts designating 
specific wilderness areas may provide specific direction for the management of mineral activities. 
Regulations at 36 CFR 228 and 293 provide direction for managing mineral activities in wilderness.
The most notable aspect o f  this policy is the recognition o f  which statute guides 
mineral exploration and development depending on the existence o f  a valid claim. 
The CFR regulations cited above pertain to mining in wilderness and the mining 
permit process itself. These regulations reiterate several points already covered in 
this analysis, such as: no prospecting after the date the wilderness area is removed 
from the general mining laws, reasonable stipulations for the protection o f  wilderness 
character shall be imposed, and no permits shall be issued for “common varieties” of 
minerals as stated in the Minerals Act o f 1947.^®
The Forest Service has specific “Policy” and “Objectives” criteria for mining 
and mineral prospecting in wilderness as well. Similar to the overarching policies 
discussed above, these are much more mining specific:
2323.72 - Objectives®®
”  Id.
-’"3 6  CFR § 293.14 
http://vvvvw.wilderness.net./inde.\.cfm?fiise=NWPS&sec-policyFS.
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1. To preserve the wilderness environment while allowing activities for the purpose of gathering 
information about mineral resources.
2. To ensure that mineral exploration and development operations conducted in accordance with 
valid existing rights for federally owned, locatable, and leasable minerals (FSM 2810 and FSM 
2820) and for nonfederally owned minerals {FSM 2830) while preserving the wilderness 
resource to the extent possible.
3. To ensure the restoration of lands disturbed during exploration and development activities as 
nearly as practicable promptly upon abandonment of operations.
In this “Objectives” section, one sees the dichotomy imposed on Forest Service
wilderness management forcing the Service to balance wilderness preservation
against continued mineral exploration and development.
2323.73 - Policy®“
1. Allow the gathering of information on mineral resources if the activity is conducted in a manner 
compatible with the preservation of the wilderness environment. Do not authorize significant 
surface disturbance in search of indirect evidence or indications of mineral resources, and do 
not allow motorized or mechanical equipment use unless it meets the conditions o f section 4(c) 
of the W ilderness Act.
2. Verify valid mineral rights before approving exploration and development activities.
3. Approve exploration and development activities on valid mineral rights only after ensuring that 
mineral operations plans contain stipulations to protect the wilderness character of the land 
consistent with the rights of the mineral owner or operator.
This “Policy” section only serves to reiterate the wilderness and mining dichotomy
once again. The problem here is the untenable nature o f trying to support the concept
o f wilderness while allowing mining to take place at the same time and in the same
place. However, the agencies will have a hard time refusing a mining operation
meeting anything close to the criterion set forth above. If it is to be refused, it will
have to be on other legal grounds besides the Wilderness Act. Instead, it seems the
wilderness manager’s role is to recognize the legally excepted non-conforming use
and ensure the impact of that use on the wilderness resource is minimized.*^' Mining
needs to be managed in as strict and pure a method as possible if  the existing
Id.
Kovalicky, Poncin and Williams, M anagem ent o f  N oiiconfonning  Uses in Wilderness^ Proc. o f  
Conference on M anaging A m erica 's  Enduring Wilderness Resource, p. 278-81 at 280.
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wilderness resource is to be as close as possible to a legislatively pure wilderness.^' 
The wilderness manager needs to be relentless in looking for opportunities resulting 
in reduced impacts to the wilderness r e s o u r c e . J o h n  C. Hendee, a premier expert on 
wilderness management, has this to say about mining in wilderness:
“The negative impacts o f  mining to wilderness naturalness and wildness are 
extensive. Even old mines that have been “played out” may continue to 
impact wilderness with their residual buildings, junk heaps, mine tailings, and 
roads that continue to erode and invite vehicle trespass, not to mention the 
visual and ecological impacts o f these historical remnants.
As Mr. Hendee would have it, even the culturally historical remnants of small mining
operations continue to plague wilderness resources and values, much less to consider
the impacts o f  a mine the size o f  the proposed Rock Creek Mine in the CMW, a mine
purporting to extract 136 million tons o f ore to acquire an estimated 2 billion pounds
o f  copper and 227 million ounces o f silver.^^ When one balances the effects of a
mining operation o f  this size against the preservation o f  wilderness character, one has
to wonder just what kind o f  balancing is involved.
Forest Service policies more or less spell out what kind o f  balancing is to take 
place. First, the Forest Service is to evaluate any “Proposed Operating Plan” 
submitted by the holder o f mineral claims to determine if valid rights existed prior to 
mineral withdrawal and what rights are recognized.^*’ Second, consistent with the 
valid existing rights, the Service is to review and only approve operating plans 
incorporating reasonable terms and conditions for the protection of the wilderness
Id.
Id.
H endee & Dawson, Steward.sliip to .Address the Threats to W ilderness Resources and Values, 
International Journal o f  Wilderness, Vol. 7 - #3, p. 7 (Dec 2(J01).
http://biz.yahoo.com./bw/040308/S5430_] .html.
"" http://www.wilderness.net/inde.\.cfm?fuse=NW PS&sec=policyFS. (FS Manual 2323.75)
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character o f the area, and providing for restoration as near as practicable o f the 
disturbed lands promptly upon abandonment of operations.'"^ Consequently, the 
balancing act involved here is not to mine or not to mine in wilderness, instead, the 
evaluation o f any proposed mining operating plans is simply to determine the validity 
o f their claims and to ensure the operations reasonably provide for the protection of 
wilderness character, as well as adequate reclamation and restoration post mine 
closure. The debate, therefore, lies within the concepts o f  the “reasonableness” and 
“practicability” o f the restrictions the Service imposes on a mining operation during 
its lifetime and after its demise, not the more altruistic debate of whether or not to 
mine in wilderness at all. With this current set o f  laws, regulations and policies in 
place, mining in wilderness is inevitable. It is just a matter o f  time and the right set of 
circumstances.
11. Bureau o f  Land Management (BLM)
BLM wilderness management policy is only to be found in the Code of 
Federal Regulations, No effort has been made to expand on these regulations, or to 
create a similar policy manual to the Forest Service manual cited above.
Consequently, there is more room, potentially, for agency discretion, as the CFR 
regulations do not provide management guidance as specific as the Forest Service 
Manual. There are really no differences worth mentioning between the policy 
mandates for BLM wilderness management and those mandates for the Forest Service 
discussed above. One aspect worth mentioning though, is the original purpose behind 
the BLM was to facilitate the giving away of our public lands to anyone interested in
''' Id. (FS Manual § 2323.75a)
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developing it for some reason, including the mining interests. With the passage of the 
Federal Land Policy Management Act (FLFMA), BLM acquired a similar multiple 
use mandate to that o f  the Forest Service, including the management and preservation 
o f wilderness areas.
HI. National Park Sej-xice (NFS)
The NFS has very different mandates when it comes to mining in wilderness 
areas under their watch. The NFS Policy Manual contains only one provision 
concerning mining in wilderness and it does not take a pro-mining stance:
Mineral Development
The National Park Service will seek to eliminate valid mining claims and nonfederal mineral 
interests in wilderness through acquisition. In parks where Congress has authorized the leasing 
of federal minerals, the Park Service will take appropriate actions to preclude the leasing of 
lands or minerals that are included within wilderness. Lands included within wilderness will be listed 
as excepted areas under applicable regulations in 43 CFR 3100 and 3500.
The first two sentences in this policy mandate are very clear. All valid mining claims 
within NFS managed wilderness areas are to be eliminated through acquisition, end 
o f  story. Further, any efforts to lease mineral rights, by Congress or otherwise, will 
be actively precluded. Finally, the policy refers to the mining application and 
approval regulations under the BLM ’s jurisdiction and specifies all NFS wilderness 
will be listed as excepted areas under those regulations, otherwise meaning: no 
mineral development, period. Authority for these uncompromising policies is derived 
from the National Parks and Recreation Act of 1978, which provided further 
incentive for the Secretary o f  the Interior to promulgate tough regulations on mining 
in National P a r k s . I t  is fair to say, the NFS has a very different approach to mining
Supra Note 7 at p. 197; 16 U.S.C. ÿ 3; 36 CFR ÿ 9a et al.
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in wilderness than the Forest Service or the BLM. For the purpose of protecting the 
wilderness resource, it is also fair to say, the NFS policy is far superior.
IV. United States Fish and Wildlife Senhce (USFWS)
The USFWS is charged with managing a surprising number o f wilderness 
areas across the continental United States and Alaska, 71 altogether.®^ It should be 
noted, without exception, all the wilderness areas managed by the USFWS are found 
within the administrative confines o f the National Wildlife Refuge System 
(NWRS).^^ While the USFWS regulations include a specific section on wilderness 
management, it is very interesting to note a complete lack of mining specific 
regulations there in / ' If  one is looking for regulations controlling USFWS 
management of mining activities within their jurisdiction, one has to look to the 
regulations controlling NWRS management. Only two regulations are on point for 
mining activities:
§ 29.31 Mineral ownerships In the United States/^
Where mineral rights to lands in wildlife refuge areas are vested in the United States, the provisions of 
43 CFR 3101.5-1 govern -  (this Dept, o f  the In te rior p rovis ion sets forth a lis t o f  p ro tected  pub lic lands  
w ithdrawn from  leasing through a num ber o f resource extraction re la ted  law s and regulations.)
§ 29.32 Mineral rights reserved and excepted/^
Persons holding mineral rights in wildlife refuge lands by reservation in the conveyance to the United 
States and persons holding mineral rights in such lands which rights vested prior to the acquisition of 
the lands by the United States shall, to the greatest extent practicable, conduct all exploration, 
development, and production operations in such a manner as to prevent damage, erosion, pollution, or 
contamination to the lands, waters, facilities and vegetation of the area. So far as is practicable, such 
operations must also be conducted without interference with the operation of the refuge or disturbance 
to the wildlife thereon. Physical occupancy of the area must be kept to the minimum space compatible 
with the conduct of efficient mineral operations. Persons conducting mineral operations on refuge areas 
must comply with all applicable Federal and State laws and regulations for the protection of wildlife and 
the administration of the area. Oil field brine, slag, and all other waste and contaminating substances 
must be kept in the smallest practicable area, must be confined so as to prevent escape as a result of 
rains and high water or otherwise, and must be removed from the area as quickly as practicable in 
such a manner as to prevent contamination, pollution, damage, or injury to the lands, waters, facilities,
http://w\v\v.\vildeniess.net/index.ct 'm?fuse=NW PS&sec=manageFWS.
Id.
50 CFR § 35.1 -3 5 .1 4 .
■- 50 C F R  § 29.31.
”  50 C FR  § 29.32.
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or vegetation of the refuge or to wildlife. Structures and equipment must be removed from ttie area 
when the need for them has ended. Upon the cessation of operations the area shall be restored as 
nearly as possible to its condition prior to the commencement of operations. Nothing in this section shall 
be applied so as to contravene or nullify rights vested in holders of mineral interests on refuge lands.
While the emboldened “practicable” does appear in this regulation quite often, the
language mandates much stronger support for preservation than does the Forest
Service or BLM mandates. However, this policy does not equate to the ambitiously
anti-mining stance o f  the NFS. The USFWS mining regulations seem to put a high
premium on pushing the mining industry to do its best, albeit within “practicable”
limits, to minimize its impact on a given refuge. On the ground, it is hard to say
whether this regulation would result in tougher controls on mining than with the
Forest Service or the BLM. An interesting side note: the USFWS does have
ANILCA specific internal mining policies pertaining to ANWAR and other refuges
on Alaska’s northern coastal p l a i n . N o t a b l y ,  this policy addresses the
Congressionally mandated Alaska Mineral Resource Assessment Program and its
potential impacts to N W R ’s and wildernesses contained therein.
The various policy mandates of the agencies charged with managing 
wilderness areas provide good insight as to how managers must deal with mining 
activities. However, they do not tell the whole story. Court challenges, political 
pressure and administrative discretion must still be examined on a case-by-case basis 
to further illuminate the story sunounding any individual efforts to begin mining in 
wilderness.
C  Case Law Specific to M ining in Wilderness
http://w\v\s .wiiderness.net/NWPS documents.''FWS_wilderness_poIicy.doc. 
M  at g 8.8(k).
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If  only one thing was to be said o f the Federal Judiciary’s effort to reconcile 
the internal contradiction of mining in wilderness, it would have to be one o f  those 
issues implicitly considered a political question for Congress to resolve, not the 
courts. This issue has confronted the courts numerous times and in several different 
fashions, but no decision on the specific issue of mining in wilderness as a legislative 
conundrum, in need o f  resolution, has ever stood up to appellate review and become 
legal precedent.
In a case involving BLM lands in Wyoming’ ’̂, the Court addressed the issue 
o f mining in wilderness, but not the contradictions therein. Instead, the court simply 
revisited the Congressional and Senate committee reports where the contradiction 
came alive through political compromise. The Court set forth its view of the issue 
like this;
“Thus, Congress intended that no activity on the public lands following the 
Act's passage be allowed to degrade lands containing wilderness values on the 
date o f  enactment, precluding their consideration for wilderness suitability 
before the review proeess was concluded. A qualified exception to this policy 
decision was made for “mining and grazing uses and mineral leasing.
One cannot say this Court really addressed the problem caused by the Wilderness 
Act’s internal contradictions. Instead, the court added to the problem by providing a 
blind interpretation o f committee deliberations serving only to reinforce the 
contradictions.
Another case purporting to delve into this politically explosive issue dealt 
with an eastern wilderness known as Otter C r e e k . I n  this case, the mining interest.
R o ck \’ M tn. O il & Gas Assn. v. H’aR. 696 F.2d 734 ( 10’" Cir. 1982). 
/(/. at 748.
O/fer OveA- C W  Co. v. C.&. 231 Ct.Cl. 878 (1982).
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Otter Creek Coal Company, felt the workings o f  the Wilderness Act, the Eastern 
Wilderness Act and the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act added up to a 
legislative taking o f their right to mine within the wilderness area/^ What this case 
really added up to was a mining company who had no interest in actually trying to 
mine in this wilderness area, so it was trying to get the government to pay it for lost 
mining claims per the legislative takings issue mentioned a b o v e . The mining 
company even refused to comply with the SMCRA requirements to determine if it 
had valid existing rights for fear that the determination would justify refusing to 
permit the mine without abrogating the company’s rights, giving way to a takings 
claim.®' Consequently, while this case deals with mining in wilderness, it offers no 
insight into the internal legislative contradictions o f  mining in wilderness.
In a seminal case involving BLM land withdrawals under Section 204e of 
FLPMA, Montana District Court Judge William J. Jameson, in typical fashion, 
authored a concise and fair decision on several issues pertaining to mining in BLM 
managed wilderness.®" The major points are as follows: ( 1 ) section o f  Federal Land 
Policy and Management Act o f 1976 did not give the House Committee on Interior 
and Insular Affairs the power to direct Secretary o f Interior to withdraw wilderness 
areas from mineral exploration and leasing until January 1, 1984 and the Committee's 
resolution to that effect impermissibly conflicted with section o f Wilderness Act o f 
1964 which permitted mineral exploration and leasing activities until that date; (2) the 
scope and duration o f the withdrawal order were within sound discretion of Secretary
Id.
Id.
Id.
P acific Legal Fouiulalioii v. Wall. 529 F.Siipp 982 (D.C. Mont. 1981 ),
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to be exercised in accordance with rules and procedural requirements of FLPMA, 
subject to Judicial review; and (3) Secretary had power to revoke, after reasonable 
time, the withdrawal order made at request of either the House or Senate Committee 
on Energy and Natural Resources.
Further, the decision also determined “applications” for the right to develop or 
explore mineral claims or leases constituted a “property right” and, as such, 
applicants are entitled to an administrative review o f  those applications.®'* While 
Judge Jameson’s decision touched on a number o f critical points relating to 
Congressional attempts to tinker with wilderness administration, it did not really 
touch on the Wilderness Act’s own internal contradictions. Instead, by taking judicial 
notice o f  the January 1, 1984 deadline for wilderness lands’ removal from the 
operation of general mining laws, Judge Jameson’s decision only serves to indirectly 
reinforce the Act’s contradictions. It should be noted, however. Judge Jameson was 
known for his skillful interpretation o f  the law as written, not for his judicial activism, 
and judicial activism is exactly what was needed to effectively address this issue.
One judicial effort that came close to this level o f  activism was a case 
involving ingress/egress to mining claims in the Kalmiopsis and North Fork John Day 
Wilderness A r e a s . T h e  Court was asked to review an administrative decision by the 
Forest Service to disallow motorized access to either claim.®'’ The Court o f  Appeals 
held that: ( 1 ) the Forest Service had statutory authority to regulate means o f  access to 
mining claims located within wilderness and other areas o f national forests; (2) the
Id.
CIc 
Id.
louser V. Espy, 42 F3d. 1522 (9"’ C.r. 1994).
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miners failed to exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking judicial review; 
and (3) the Forest Service did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in determining that 
motorized access to mining claim in wilderness area was not essential or the 
historically used method.®' An interesting aspect of this case reflecting the judicial 
activism mentioned above was the Court could have summarily dismissed this case 
for lack o f  standing as the claimants had failed to exhaust their administrative 
remedies. However, the Court chose to rule on the non-motorized access issue 
anyways, resulting in the only judicial blow of this sort ever dealt to the mining 
industry where wilderness is concerned.
Only once has a member o f the federal judiciary ever tried to face up to the 
inherent contradiction of mining within wilderness. In 1973, District Court Judge 
Neville held that, by statute, mineral exploration and/or extraction was effectively 
banned in the Boundary Waters Canoe Area (BWCA), a congressionally created 
wilderness area, noticeably prior to the January 1, 1984 withdrawal o f  all wilderness 
lands.®®
In supporting this decision, Neville cited a lengthy cadre o f statutes, beginning 
in the late 19̂ ’’ century, leading up to the passage o f the Wilderness Act itself. But 
Judge Neville did not stop there. He then proceeded through all the legal issues 
related to the government taking away a private entity’s mineral interests.®^ These 
issues included: the power of the federal government to impose zoning restrictions on 
federal land; legal abandonment o f  a mining claim and/or laches, as it would pertain 
to the same abandonment issue in equity; ingress/egress issues related to accessing
'  Id.
Izaak IVahon League o f  .-iinerica r. St. Clair. 35? F.Supp 698 (D.C. Minn. 1973).
Id.
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the mineral rights; the BW CA’s specific treatment o f mining both in statute and 
congressional committees; and finally, the procedural issues surrounding the purview 
o f  the court to provide injunctive relief in this situation/'^
Judge Neville forcefully restated the ultimate policy of the wilderness Act and 
recognized the inconsistency;
“ The task before this court is to divine the fundamental and prevailing intent o f  Congress 
from the various acts passed from time to time as above recited and to determine whether it is 
consistent with the position taken by the plaintiff and the State or that taken by the Federal 
defendants and/or St. Clair. It seems to the court that the various statutory acts and 
administrative regulations, including the most recent Wilderness Act o f  1964, contain within 
themselves fundamental inconsistencies. A Wilderness purpose plain and simply has to be 
inconsistent with and antagonistic to a purpose to allow any commercial activity such as 
mining within the BWCA. "
Judge Neville went on to explain the impacts o f  mining in the BWCA and its 
irreconcilable effects;
“There can be no question but that full mineral development and mining will destroy and 
negate the wilderness or most o f  it. Even any substantial exploratory operation such as core 
drilling will require a means o f  ingress and egress, a communications system o f  some kind, 
the establishment o f  various camp sites, the importation o f  food, clothing, etc., power lines 
and the modification to a greater or lesser extent o f  the environment. Should minerals be 
discovered in commercially productive quantities and be amenable to open pit mining as in 
o ther locations in Minnesota or as in taconite sites, the purpose and values o f  almost the entire 
B W C A  is lost. The same is true, but to somewhat lesser degree, should any mining be done in 
the conventional underground method. In either event, access as by railroad, or highway is 
necessary, areas o f  timber must be logged off, a water supply must be obtained and other 
wilderness interferences effected. It is clear that wilderness and mining are incompatible. 
Wilderness exists because man has not yet intruded upon it. Once penetrated by civilization 
and man made activities, it cannot be regained for perhaps hundreds o f  years. The recovery 
period is meaningless for generations to come. The destruction is irreversible. So with mining, 
logging o ff  and other activities, they are anathema to all wilderness values.'^'
Finally, Neville resolved the wilderness mining conflict in favor of wilderness. He 
found the mining use was unreasonable in light o f the irrevocable changes to 
wilderness quality:
M  at 713. 
Id. at 714.
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"A mineral resource developer cannot proceed without making use o f  the surface o f  the land. 
Any use o f  the surface for the e.xploration or extraction o f  minerals becomes an unreasonable 
use because the surface is no longer wilderness and is irreversibly and irretrievably destroyed 
tor generations to come. Mineral development thus by its \ ery definition cannot take place in 
a wilderness area; else it no longer is a wilderness area. One has to reach the conclusion that if 
the area is to remain true wilderness, there is no reasonable usage to which the surface can be 
put and still retain the area's character as wilderness. An open-pit mine for instance or an 
underground mine with resultant piles o f  slag or refuse and all equipment needed can never 
reasonably be undone. There is an inherent inconsistency in the Congressional Act and it falls 
in the lap o f  the court to determine which purpose Congress deemed most important and thus 
intended. In this court's opinion the Wilderness objectives override the contrary mineral right 
provision o f  the statute. Otherwise, the Congressional Act is a nullity,
This argument lays out the perfect blueprint for any subsequent judicial efforts to 
undo the conflicting mandates of the Wilderness Act. Unfortunately, this brilliant 
piece o f  legal craftsmanship was largely relegated into legal obscurity through the 
appeals process through the Eighth Circuit. The Forest Service was able to argue its 
administrative procedures for permitting the operational stage o f  the mine 
development process had not been completed, and therefore, the controversy was not 
ripe for judicial review.
However, the Appellate Court did specify it was not rendering any opinion as 
to the legal veracity o f  Judge Neville’s substantive judgment on the Wilderness Act’s 
internal contradictions. As such, this case may be cited as persuasive precedent, 
overruled on other grounds, to support any future argument against mining in 
wilderness as contravening the intended purpose of the Wilderness Act. However, 
recognizing it only constitutes persuasive support, one should realize any court 
hearing such an argument could simply choose to ignore this Neville opinion and 
decide the issue in favor o f  mining in wilderness. As mentioned above, several cases 
tacitly recognize the mining exception as valid and so there would be case law to cite
Id. at 715.
Izaak Wallon League o f  Am erica  r. St. C laii\ 497 F.2d 849. at 853 {8"' Cir. 1974).
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
3 2
to the contrary of Judge Neville’s opinion/^ However, there are always risks 
involved with using precedent like this in court to foster a difficult, politicized legal 
argument on such a charged issue as mining in wilderness. It is as likely to backfire 
on whoever uses it, as it is likely to succeed.
IV. Cabinet Mountains Controversy: Sterling Mining Co. Set to 
Open First W ilderness Mine in Continental U.S. since 1984 Deadline
Congress designated the CMW in 1964, and it now has 94,272 acres within its 
borders.^^ Offering prime habitat for several large ungulates (elk, moose, mountain 
goat, and predator species (grizzly and black bear, mountain lion, and even the 
elusive wolverine is suspected of inhabiting the range), the CMW measures only 
seven miles across at its widest and less than one mile across in several locations.^^
As such, the current proposal to open a large-scale copper/silver mine in and adjacent 
to the southwest comer o f  the CMW threatens significant impacts to the wilderness 
character o f  this small northwest-southeast corridor of alpine splendor.
Historically, the Cabinet Mountains have seen quite a bit o f mining activity.
Since the 1860’s, miners have extracted copper, silver, gold, lead, and zinc from 
geologic fomiations in the r a n g e . P l a c e r  mining o f  gold began in the 1860’s and 
lode mining soon followed.*’̂*̂ Numerous adits still remain in the wilderness area from 
lode mining o f  gold-bearing quartz veins in the 1920’s and 30’s."^°
d o u s e r  V. E xp\\ 42 F.3d 1522 (9''’ Cir, 1994).; Pacific Legal Foiiiulalion  r. Watt, 529 F. Supp. 982 
(D. Mont. 1981),'
http://vvvvw.wilderness.net/inde.\,ctm?fuse=NVVPS&sec-=wiidVievv&WID=91.
Id.
D onna J. Loop, C laim ing the Cabinets: The R ight to M ine in W ilderness, p. 26 (Published Thesis, U. 
o f  M ontana 1986).
M,
Id. (Citing the Forest Serv ice’s “U.S. Bora.x-Rock Lake Mineral Report” , p. 1Ü (Feb, 27, 1985)).
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The current Rock Creek mining proposal has its origin in the mid-1960’s 
when Bear Creek Mining Co, (a subsidiary of Kennecott Copper Corp.) discovered 
and explored the stratabound copper-silver deposits o f  the Revett Formation in the 
Cabinet r a n g e . I n  1965, the Bear Creek Mining Co. staked out its desired mining 
claims within the newly proclaimed boundary of the CMW."^“ In the mid-1970’s, 
Bear Creek sold out its interests in the Cabinets to ASARCO, who continued the 
process o f  staking out claims in and around the w i l d e r n e s s . I n  1979, ASARCO 
submitted a plan o f  operations for mineral exploration in the Chicago Peak area of the 
w i l d e r n e s s . T h e  Forest Service concluded the plan o f operations complied with all 
applicable laws, including the Wilderness Act, and approved the plan accordingly.'^'^
With permit in hand, ASARCO drilled two holes within the wilderness 
boundary and three holes immediately outside the boundary. Encouraged by the 
results from the exploratory drilling, ASARCO proposed a comprehensive four-year 
operating plan in 1980 to determine the extent and value o f  the deposit.'"^ This 
proposed plan was designed to meet the requirements o f  the Wilderness Act for 
establishing valid rights on or before December 31, 1983.'®® Due to compliance 
issues with the Endangered Species Act (ESA), not the Wilderness Act, numerous 
restrictions and stipulations were placed on the plan before it was approved.'®® While 
the ESA provided the regulatory hammer, many o f  the restrictions and stipulations
"" Id. at p .27 (Citing the Forest Serv ice’s "U.S. Bora.\-Rock Lake Mineral Report” , p. 9-1! (Feb. 27, 
1985)).
Id.
Id. (Citing the Forest Service 's  “A SA RCO -Rock Creek Mineral Report”, p. 52 (Oct. 25, 1985)). 
Id.
Id. at p. 27-28.
/(/. at p. 28.
Id.
A/, at p. 28-29.
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benefited the preservation o f wilderness character as well. These restrictions 
included: a shortened drilling season; strict helicopter use limitations; drill site 
operation and recovery requirements; water, soil, and vegetative protection measures; 
posting o f  a reclamation bond; measures to reduce air, noise, and visual pollution; and 
wildlife and water monitoring programs."^
In the early stages o f  ASARCO’s first attempt at opening the mine for 
development, a concurrent “validity” examination took place to determine the extent 
o f  the company’s valid existing rights on claims within the wilderness. The BLM 
issued its Mineral Report for ASARCO’s Rock Creek claims in 1985, documenting 
101 out o f  133 claims situated partly or entirely within the wilderness to be valid 
under both the Wilderness Act and the 1872 Mining Act." ‘ However, the section of 
the report concerning the marketability test required for discovery o f a valuable 
mineral deposit noted the markets for both copper and silver were currently 
depressed, with an “uncertain” outlook for silver and a “not very promising” outlook 
for copper, circa 1985."*
Nevertheless, ASARCO pursued a permit to commence mining operations 
soon after resolving the validity status o f their many claims in the Rock Creek area. 
This resulted in the Forest Service issuing its first draft EIS (DEIS) on ASARCO’s 
complete operational plan for the Rock Creek Mine in 1987.“ "  However, fierce 
opposition to the m ine’s opening came from a number o f  fronts, some most 
unexpected, such a highly organized business community in Sand Point, ID, a small
' Id. at p. 29.
Id. at p. 31 (Citing the Forest Service’s “A SA R C O -R ock Creek Mineral Report” (Oct. 25, 1985)). 
"  ̂ http://www.missoulane\vs.com/Ncvvs/'News.asp?no=2180.
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resort community on the shores o f Lake Pend Oreille, fearing their precious lake 
would be polluted by toxic mining waste. Failing commodity values for both copper 
and silver compounded the fierce opposition to the mine. As a result, ASARCO not 
only chose to abandon the Rock Creek Mine project, but also closed the doors on 
their fully operational Troy Mine after thirteen years o f  production from 1981- 
1993.
Very little was heard o f the Rock Creek mine during the early and mid- 
I990’s, but the issue re-emerged in full when ASARCO, and its parent company 
Kennecott Copper Corp. mentioned briefly above, announced the sale o f their interest 
in both Rock Creek and the Troy Mine to Sterling Mining Company in 1999.”  ̂ An 
interesting aspect o f this transaction was the form of compensation taken by 
ASARCO and Kennecott, as ASARCO’s parent company: as partial compensation, 
they took a 20% ownership interest in Sterling Mining Company."^ While not a 
controlling interest, leading to definite conflicts o f interest, it is still a major interest 
in Sterling, making the deal very questionable indeed.
In any event, upon acquisition of the Rock Creek Project, Sterling began an 
immediate push to finalize the Forest Service’s decision to approve the mine before 
the end o f  2000. In September 2001, the Forest Service released its final EIS (FEIS) 
on the proposed operational plan. Wilderness and wilderness related values received 
relatively nominal treatment given the enormity of the entire document. O f the well 
over one thousand pages in the document, only ten or so pages o f diseussion were 
dedicated to wilderness related issues. Although, one may read wilderness issues into
' '■* http://\v\v\v.missoLilian.coni/specials/troy/troy02.html.
http://www.claikfork.org/sterlingreport.pdf.
“ http://www.meic.org/Sterling_Rock Creek.html.
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many other aspects o f the FEIS, including sections on; habitat degradation and 
resulting effects on all native wildlife, negative affects on water quality, air quality, 
and many others.
Specifically, wilderness is first addressed in Volume 1, Chapter 3 o f the FEIS. 
This chapter’s focus was describing the affected environment o f  the proposed 
operating plan submitted by Sterling Mining Company. The “Affected Environment” 
section pertaining to wilderness first described the CMW briefly and then described 
two separate “opportunity classes” within the wilderness as defining management 
characteristics for the a rea ." ’ Opportunity Class I areas are pristine and without 
recreation trails o f  any sort."® These areas may have light-use and un-maintained 
backpacking trails but no stock use."'’ Opportunity Class 2 areas are found along 
heavily used trail corridors and lake basins. Heavy use patterns have resulted in 
varied, but at times heavy, impacts, and it has been a management priority to mitigate 
those im pacts." ' Opportunity Class 2 areas comprise about 15% o f  the CMW; the 
other 85% being class I . " ’ This discussion o f the affected wilderness environment 
takes up all o f  one page in the FEIS document.
The significant treatment the wilderness issue receives is in Volume 1,
Chapter 4, dealing with the environmental consequences to the CMW from the five 
proposed alternatives in the FEIS. The administrative guidelines for this discussion
Final Environmental Impact Statement. Rock Creek Project, Volume 1, Chapter 3, Page 136-137 
(Septem ber 2001 ). http://www.rs.fed.us/rl/kootenai/projects/projects/rock_creeVdocs/Volume_I.pdl
Id. at p. 137.
Id.
Id.
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
3 7
are rather straightforward. The wilderness management mandates are set forth as 
follows:
“ T h e  W ilderness  A ct d irects  the Forest Service to p ro tec t the natural charac ter  o f  wilderness 
and  to p rov ide  for recreational, scenic, scientific, educational,  cultural,  and  historical uses o f  
w ilderness  areas. T he  four requis ite  a ttr ibutes o f  w ilde rness  are:
1. N atura l  Integrity: the ex ten t to w h ich  h u m an  influences  alter na tura l p rocesses  by 
co m p ar in g  the condition  o f  the area to its p robab le  eond it ion  w ithout hum an  contact.
2. A p p a re n t  N atura lness:  c lose ly  rela ted  to natural integrity. Both qualities m ay be 
alte red  by  the sam e activities. A pparen t  na tu ra lness  focuses on  how  the activities are 
pe rce ived  by  the genera l public. T hey  include im pacts  that are seen, heard , or 
sm elled .
3. Solitude: isolation from the ev idence  an d  presence  o f  o ther  hum ans. Features that 
con tr ibu te  to solitude include size o f  area and  d is tance  from perim eter  to center. 
V ege ta t ion  and topograph ic  screen ing  are also rela ted  to solitude.
4. P rim itive  Recrea tion : p rov ides  opportun ities  for isolation from  the ev idence  o f  
hum ans . V is itors  feel they are a part  o f  the natural env ironm ent.  T hey  m ay  en joy  a 
high deg ree  o f  ehallenge, risk, and  use o f  o u tdoor  skills.
T he  Forest Serv ice  also describes  additional w ilderness  a ttr ibutes o f  ou ts tand ing  ecological, 
geo logica l,  scenic  and historical features. Ecological features inc lude  endangered  or 
th rea tened  species  o f  an im als ,  plants and  old g row th  vegetation . G eo log ica l features include 
land forms represen ting  signif icant exam ples  o f  geo logical p rocesses. Scenic values  are based 
on  sign if ican t scenic qualities  o f  the natural landscape  in the w ilderness . The  quality  o f  these 
fea tures  d ep en d s  on  how  unusual, ou ts tanding , and  u n co m m o n  the natural features are in the 
landscape  o f  the geograph ic  region. Cultural and  historical features com prise  all ev idence  o f  
historic  and preh is toric  hum an  use o f  an  area .” '"'
Using this framework, and the “four requisite attributes o f wilderness”, the FEIS 
wilderness analysis proceeds through the five proposed alternatives, though the vast 
majority o f  the analysis is on alternative II. The alternatives, one being no mine at 
all, each contain different ideas for the size and location o f  the surface attributes o f 
the mine, how close the mine can come to the surface, what roads can be built and 
what roads should closed, habitat requirements for the endangered species affected, 
and many other less notable differences. Accordingly, each alternative is given 
slightly different treatment with regard to this wilderness aspect of the analysis.
12.̂ Id. Chapter 4, p. 255-256.
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
3 8
Alternative I, the “no action” alternative was given short shrift, as it would 
leave everything as normal. Alternative II, proposed by Sterling Mining Company as 
their preferred alternative, is given an in depth analysis.'"'^
With respect to “natural integrity” as discussed above, the Forest Service 
makes the following comments: the only surface structure within the wilderness 
would be a ventilation adit on a 60°, north aspect slope and its construction would 
take place during the goat summer/transition range disturbing about 3000ft" o f surface 
area.'"^ Further, air pollution from the tailings impoundments outside the wilderness, 
as w ell as the proposed mill site, could contaminate the wilderness’s class 1 airshed, 
but the Forest Service figures the contaminate levels to be well below federal and 
state standards.'"^ There is a “remote” possibility mine subsidence could occur, 
causing extreme changes in topography and/or lake water levels in the area, including 
the subsidence of an entire lake.'"^ There is a possibility that post-closure ground 
water seepage from the underground mine reservoir could exit in outcrop zones 
within the wilderness, creating new, potentially contaminated, unnatural water 
sources.'"® Displacement o f  some wildlife species from areas disturbed by mining 
activities could increase wildlife populations within the wilderness area, causing 
isolated areas of habitat within the wilderness to become altered or stressed.'"'^
Finally, certain natural processes within the wilderness may be altered by the mining
O nly  the ana lysis  for A lternative  II is included in this text, to revisit  the sam e analysis  for each 
alte rna tive  w o u ld  be unproductive .  It is worth noting  there are small d isc repanc ies  betw ecu each o f  the 
four p ro p o sed  a lternatives  w here  the mine is opened , but no  d ifference  so b ig  as to e lim inate  the 
substan tia l  e ffects  the m ine  w ould  have on the C M W .
Id. at p. 256.
'-■Id.
Id.
Id.
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operation, including impacts on grizzly bears and mountain goats such as 
displacement and degradation of habitat, but the wilderness area would largely retain 
its existing character “provided subsidence did not o c c u r " . All o f these impacts 
come solely under the effect on the wilderness’s “natural integrity" attribute. With 
analysis this thorough, one cannot see how this proposed mine could possibly pass 
muster with such impacts.
The analysis then moves on to this alternative’s effects on “apparent 
naturalness”. First, the Forest Service addresses the ventilation adit: the adit and its 
construction would be visible from the East Fork Bull River drainage, but not from 
any popular trails, so for most wilderness visitors, no change in “apparent 
naturalness’’ would occur, and after the mine closes the adit will be sealed with 
cement, further reducing its effects.'^’ Some visitors, however, will consider the 
knowledge o f  the adit’s existence an emotional affront to the wilderness’s “apparent 
naturalness’’. ' ’" Certain portions o f  the mine’s surface structures can be seen from 
within the wilderness, affecting the “apparent naturalness” o f non-designated lands 
next to the w i l d e r n e s s . M i n e  related noises from the mine construction, ventilation 
adit, blasting underground, blasting the exploration adit, activity at the mill site itself, 
and operation of large motor vehicles will disturb the auditory naturalness mostly in 
the Chicago Peak vicinity of the CMW.'^"^ Lastly, short term and intennittent air
""M  at p. 257.
' fd.
' Id.
' ■ ■ A / .
' - " / A .
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pollution should be expected to affect some wilderness visitors depending on 
conditions.'^®
The analysis for “solitude and primitive recreation” begins with a similar 
point to “apparent naturalness” : to the extent people using the wilderness directly or 
indirectly perceive the existence o f this mine, their sense o f  solitude and opportunity 
for primitive recreation will be degraded.'®^’ The analysis then goes on to mention the 
900 or so new residents the mine will bring to the immediate area, some looking to 
recreate in the wilderness, as also degrading the possibility for solitude and primitive 
recreation, although the estimated impact should be negligible.'®’
The impacts on ecological, geographical, scenic and historical features are 
either wholly discounted (historical features only), or the discussion of the impacts is 
suggested to be elsewhere (Geology, Hydrology, Aquatics/Fisheries, Scenic 
Resources, Biodiversity, and Threatened and Endangered Species sections).'®*
The final analysis for Sterling’s prefened alternative involves an 
interpretation of the mining specific provisions o f the Wilderness Act.
“ Section 4 (b) o f  the W ilderness  Act states: "E x cep t  as o the rw ise  p rov ided  in this Act, 
w ilderness  areas shall be  devo ted  to the public purposes  o f  recreational,  scenic, scientific, 
educational,  conserva tion , and historic  uses .’’ The CM W  would continue to serve these 
purposes. Therefore, alternative II would be consistent with the Wilderness Act.
Section  4(d)(3) o f  the A ct states holders  o f  unpa ten ted  m in ing  claims, valid ly  established 
be fo re  m id n igh t D e c e m b e r  31, 1983, shall be  acco rded  the r ights under the 1872 M ining  Act 
on  those  N F S  lands des igna ted  by  the A ct as w ilderness  a r e a s . .. R easonab le  s t ipulations m ay 
b e  p rescr ibed  for the p ro tec tion  o f  w ilderness  cha rac te r  o f  the land consis ten t with  the use o f  
the land for the pu rposes  for w h ich  they  are leased, pem iit ted ,  or licensed. This section 
ind ica tes  m ineral opera t ions  as p roposed  can occu r  within the w ilderness  but m ay  be subject 
to m an ag em en t  requ irem en ts  above  and b eyond  those no rm ally  im posed  on operations outside
A/, a t p. 258, 
' '  " /r/.
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a w ilderness , so long as such ntanagement requirements do not prevent the operator from  
exercising due rights under the U.S. mining laws.
T h e  ventila tion  adit portal and underground  m in ing  w ith in  the C M W  are considered  necessary 
for  the p roposed  m in ing  operation. N oise  from the ventila tion  portal cou ld  degrade  the 
w ilderness  character. H ow ever ,  this is not inconsis ten t with  the W ilderness  A ct since it is 
necessa ry  for the m ine w o rk e r s ’ health  and  safety.
Given the highlighted sections o f  this final analysis, the Forest Service obviously 
feels its hands are tied when it comes to the Wilderness Act. The end of the second 
paragraph quoted gives the distinct impression the Service feels it cannot impose 
restrictions or stipulations, under the guise o f “preserving wilderness character”, 
preventing the operator from exercising due rights under the mining laws. One has to 
wonder how far the Forest Service is able to go before it is deemed to have crossed 
the line from reasonable restrictions and stipulations to abrogating rights under the 
mining laws. Nevertheless, with this sort o f  interpretation, it is no wonder the 
Wilderness Act is overlooked, time and time again, as a potential stopping block for a 
proposed mine. When other laws, like the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and the 
Clean Water Act (CWA), have no such provisions, the Forest Service is not prevented 
from using them to impose harsh restrictions resulting in a potential abrogation of 
rights under the mining laws, so why bother with the Wilderness Act.
Consequently, upon the publishing of the FEIS many challenges to the plan 
ensued, but these challenges were not based on the tenets o f  the Wilderness Act. 
Instead, the challenges were based on the ESA and the CWA and its Montana 
counterpart. Granted, these laws allow the challengers to point to specific aspects of 
the FEIS not in compliance with specific aspects of these laws, thereby making the 
challenges much more concrete and discernable than a challenge under the
Id. at p. 25S-259.
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Wilderness Act would be. It is a truly unfortunate state o f  affairs when a “landmark” 
conservation/preservation law like the Wilderness Act can provide no ground upon 
which to challenge a potentially devastating public lands project like the Rock Creek 
Mine.
V. Can the Wilderness Act stop the Rock Creek Mine or 
prevent another Rock Creek Mine in the Future?
The Rock Creek Mine in the CMW illustrates a very frustrating aspect o f the 
Wilderness Act. BaiTing certain time-related provisions within the Act resolved one 
way or the other over twenty years ago, a holder o f  a valid mining claim within a 
wilderness area can mine that claim subject only to reasonable restrictions and 
stipulations. Is there any way to change this? It seems ridiculous that this small, but 
precious, percentage o f  our public lands contained within the National Wilderness 
Preservation System, an age-old icon for public lands preservation, should be so 
exposed to the potentially horrific degradation mining can bring to an area.
Upon reflection, one can see opportunities for change in the Wilderness Act 
within all three branches o f  the federal government. Each branch (judicial, executive, 
and legislative) has had opportunities in the past to rectify the situation but chosen not 
to, and each branch could be given those opportunities again in the future. Given the 
right set o f  circumstances, the “mining in wilderness” loophole could be closed. 
However, as further discussion will reveal, the path to such closure is a difficult one, 
riddled with the possibility o f  doing more harm than good. One must think carefully 
about the possible ramifications o f revising or interpreting the Wilderness Act, for 
any attempts could serve to solidify the mining industries toehold in wilderness
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instead. Given the ever-rising demand for the minerals hidden behind the wilderness 
shield, one has to remember the mining industry would relish the opportunity to win 
this debate every bit as much as the pro-wilderness community would.
A. Judicial Reform
To date, all efforts at reforming the Wilderness Act through judicial decree 
have failed. The overriding reason has been a general resistance on the part of the 
judiciar)/ to truly address the Act’s internal dichotomies. Only Judge Neville’s 
district court decision discussed above can be said to truly address the conflicts 
between the Wilderness Act’s purpose and the existence o f  a mining exception.
Therefore, to make an argument in support o f  judicial reform to the 
Wilderness Act, one must stand entirely on persuasive rhetoric and legal precedent. 
For that matter, only Judge Neville’s opinion can be used as persuasive legal 
precedent, so one must stand largely on persuasive rhetoric. While this can be done, 
and some o f  the most inspiring instances o f the judiciary making right great wrongs in 
our society have happened in just this way, it is a steep, uphill battle, rife with the 
possibility o f failure.
Delving further into potential judicial reform, a very important issue for the 
advocate o f  change is to make sure the court hearing the case cannot dismiss or 
decide the case on some inconsequential technicality. There is a volume o f cases 
decided or dismissed on issues such as ripeness, mootness, standing, etc., thereby 
relegating those decisions ineffectual because they failed to resolve the central issue
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of  the Wilderness Act’s c o n t r a d i c t i o n s . I t  is likely future courts hearing this issue 
will attempt to move the proceedings away from such final resolution because of the 
political implications o f such a decision. Simply avoiding the many technical pitfalls 
o f  this type o f  reform litigation should prove challenging even for the most seasoned 
attorneys.
If one is able to avoid these complications and force a ruling on whether the 
mining provisions are inherently contradictory to the Wilderness Act, the argument in 
support o f  such a proposition will be most unconventional. Instead o f relying on 
traditional legal precedent, binding the court to make a decision in one’s favor, the 
argument will derive from creative legislative interpretation, reconciling and 
explaining age-old political special interests and their inappropriate interplay with 
making good law, as well as, persuasive argument for the overriding purpose of the 
Act as written to trump the mining exception said to be in direct contradiction.
Finding legal precedent to support the above mentioned arguments will be 
very difficult and will involve an exhaustive, and creative, survey o f  the entire body 
o f  federal law. To support an argument for reform, it is not important that one finds 
wilderness specific law. Such a task is not possible, only Judge Neville’s opinion 
supplies such precedent, and his opinion can only be submitted as persuasive, not 
mandatory precedent. Further, Judge Neville’s opinion can be distinguished, and 
rendered rather incompatible to mining activities in wilderness outside of Minnesota 
because the section of the Wilderness Act permitting mineral extraction is
Cloiiser V. Espy, 42 F3d, 1522 (9’'’ Cir. 1994); Izaak Walton League of A m erica v. St. Clair, 497 
F.2d 849, at 853 (8"' Cir. 1974); Pacific Legal Foundation v. Watt. 529  F.Supp 982 (D.C. Mont. 1981).
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inapplicable to the BWCA.'^^' At the time o f Neville’s decision, the general mining 
laws were inapplicable to land in Minnesota/'*^ Instead, lands in Minnesota were 
specifically exempted from the general mining laws by statute.
One must look for United States Supreme Court decisions supporting one’s 
claims in order to truly bind the entire federal judiciary. As a result, one must look to 
the entire body o f law, from anti-trust, to bankruptcy, to criminal law, seeking a 
similar set o f  circumstances where the legislative purpose o f  a law was undermined 
by subsidiary clauses within the law. The other important characteristic to look for is 
a situation where the “true” legislative purpose of the law was corrupted by the 
political process in order to conform to the desires o f  the powerful political forces at 
play during enactment.
In conducting a rather thorough survey o f United States Supreme Court cases 
giving treatment to these issues o f  internal contradiction within a statute or subsidiary 
clauses contravening a statute’s over-arching purpose, it is my conclusion that an 
attempt to make such a case for the Wilderness Act and its mining exception would 
likely fail. While my survey o f  Supreme Court decisions was not comprehensive, I 
came across a strong body o f  case law supporting the continued existence o f the 
mining exception in the Wilderness Act.'"̂ *̂
Dennis H. Elliot & L. Craig Metcalf, Closing the M ining Loophole in the 1964 W ilderness Act, 6 
Environmental Law 469, 483 (1975).
Id.
Id. ( s e e  30 u s e  § 48 (1970)).
It is necessary to qualify these cases as ones dealing with statutory interpretation and rules binding 
the courts in doing so. Accordingly, they set forth rules for interpreting the Wilderness Act, but they 
do not dictate a certain resolution for the issue o f  mining in wilderness. U.S. v. Oregon, 81 S.Ct, 1278 
( 1961 ). (Resort to legislative history is unnecessary when statute is clear and unequivocal on its lace.): 
Great-West Life & Annuit}' Ins. Co. v. Kniidson, 122 S.Ct. 708 (2002). (Vague notions o f  statute's 
basic purpose are inadequate to overcome words o f  its text regarding the specific issue under 
consideration.); National Cable & Télécommunications Ass'n, Inc. v. G ulf Power Co., 122 S.Ct. 782
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However, Supreme Court case law supporting methods of statutory 
interpretation supporting the re-evaluation, or possibly the elimination, o f  the mining 
exception exists as well. One may be able to breath life into an interpretation of the 
Act where the court could be convinced to read the mining exception as the direct 
result o f  political compromise and in unacceptable conflict with the Act’s purpose/^'
(2002). (Specif ic  s ta tu tory  language shou ld  control m ore  general language w h en  there is conflict 
be tw een  them .); Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Com'n, 107 S.Ct. 1855 (1987). 
(T h o u g h  legisla tive h is tory  can  be legitimate gu ide  to statutory purpose  obscu red  by am biguity , 
language  o f  statute i tse lf  m ust o rd inarily  be regarded  as conclusive ,  absen t any clearly expressed  
legisla tive intention to contrary .);  Blum v. Stenson. 104 S.Ct. 1541 (1984). (W here  resolution o f  
ques tion  o f  federal law turns on statute and in tention o f  C ongress ,  court  looks first to statutory 
language  and then to legislative history  if  s ta tu tory  language is unclear  ); Alaska Dept, o f  
Environmental Conservation v. E.P.A., 124 S.Ct. 983 (2004). (It is a cardinal principle o f  s tatutory 
construc tion  that statute ought, upon the w hole , to be so construed  that, i f  it can be prevented , no 
clause, sen tence , o r  w ord  shall be superfluous,  void, o r  insignificant ); Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 
123 S.Ct. 1655 (2003). (A bsen t  a s ta tu tory  text or structure  that requires  a court  to depart  from  normal 
rules o f  construc tion , the court  should  not construe  a statute in a m an n e r  that is stra ined and, at the 
sam e time, w o u ld  render  a sta tu tory  term  superfluous.); TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 122 S.Ct. 441 (2001 ). 
(It is card inal p r inc ip le  o f  s ta tu tory  construction  that statute should , upon  the w hole ,  be construed  so 
that, i f  possib le , no clause , sen tence  o r  w ord  is rendered  superfluous, void  or  insignificant.); Townsend 
V. Little, 3 S.Ct. 357 ( 1883). (G eneral and  specific p rovis ions in apparen t  contrad ic tion , w hether  in the 
sam e o r  d iffe ren t  statutes and w ithou t  regard  to priority  o f  enac tm ent,  can subsis t  together, the specific 
qualify ing  and supp ly ing  e.xceptions to the general.);  U S  v. Moore, 5 O tto  760 ( 1877). (In case o f  
seem ing  conflic t in the p rovis ions o f  a statute, the construction  should  be such that both p rovis ions if 
poss ib le  m a y  stand.); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 1 2 1 S.Ct. 1302 (2001 ). (Court ough t not 
a ttr ibu te  to C ongress  official pu rpose  based  on m otives  o f  par t icu la r  g roup  that lobbied for or against 
certa in  p roposa l ,  even a ssu m in g  that p rec ise  intent o f  g roup  can be determ ined .) ;  MCI 
Telecommunications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 114 S.Ct. 2223 (1994). (M ost re levant time 
for d e te rm in in g  statutory term 's m ean in g  is w hen  sta tu te  b ecam e  law.); U. S. v. W ise, 82 S.Ct. 1354 
(1962). (S ta tu tes  are construed  with  reference  to  c ircum stances  exis ting  at time o f  passage, and 
in terpre ta tion  p laced  upon  an ex is ting  sta tu te  by a subsequen t  g roup  p rom o tin g  legislation has  no 
p ersuas ive  s ign ificance.); Helvering v. Griffiths, 63 S.Ct. 636 (1943). (Specula tion  upon political 
factors w h ich  may have m otiva ted  cho ice  o f  language has no p lace in construction  o f  acts o f  
C ongress .) ;  Western ,4ir Lines, Inc. v. Board o f  Equalization o f  State o f  S. D., 107 S.Ct. 1038 (1987). 
(P ar ty  cou ld  not create legisla tive history for statute th rough  post hoc s ta tem ents o f  interested 
on lookers .) ;  U.S. v. Gonzales, 1 17 S.Ct. 1032 (1997), (W here  s ta tu to ry  co m m an d  is s tra ightforw ard, 
there  is no reason  to resort to legislative history.); First Nat. Bank o f  Logan, Utah v. Walker Bank & 
Trust Co., 87 S.Ct. 492 (1966). (It is not for court to construe  acts  as to  frustrate c lear-cut purpose  
forc ib ly  exp ressed  by both friend and foe o f  legislation at tim e o f  its adoption.); Cit}' o f  Columbus v. 
Ours Garage and Wrecker Service, Inc., 122 S.Ct. 2226  (2002). (C ongress iona l  decision to enact both 
a genera l po licy  that furthers  particu la r  goal and specific  excep tion  that m ight tend against that goal 
does  no t invariab ly  call for narrow est  possib le  construc tion  o f  the exception.).
It is n ecessa ry  to qua lify  these cases as ones dealing  with s ta tu tory  in te ipre ta tion  and rules b inding 
the courts  in do ing  so. A ccord ing ly ,  they set forth rules for in terpre ting  the W ilderness  Act, but they 
do  not d ic ta te  a certain  resolu tion  for the issue o f  m in ing  in w ilderness. U.S. Nat. Bank o f  Oregon v. 
Independent Ins. Agents o f  America, Inc., 1 13 S.Ct. 2173 ( 1993). (In e x p o u n d in g  statute, court must 
not be  g u id ed  by single  sen tence  or m em b er  o f  sentence, but m ust look to p rov is ions  o f  law as whole
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Unfortunately, as mentioned above, the case law supporting the continued 
existence o f  the mining exception is strong and unequivocal. Since the language 
providing for the mining exception is not ambiguous under its own terms, it is 
unlikely the court will be willing to read beyond the plain language o f  the Act to 
reach a decision. Instead, as the Act makes for a clear exception, several times 
throughout the statute, for all the uses set forth in Section 1133(d), it seems most 
likely a court will find the exception to be valid, despite being contradictory to the 
preservationist purpose behind the Act.'^^
Given the current state o f  the law, mounting a legal challenge against the 
mining exception in the Wilderness Act will be a daunting task. Any effort to do so
and  to its ob jec t  and po licy .); Crandon v. U.S., 110 S.Ct. 997  (1990). (In de te rm in ing  the m ean ing  o f  a 
statute, court  looks not on ly  to the particu lar  s ta tu tory  language bu t to the design  o f  the statute as a 
w h o le  and  to its object and  po licy  ); C.I.R. v. Engle, 104 S.Ct. 597 (1984). (S u p rem e  Court 's  du ty  in 
in terpre ting  statutory language is to  find that in terpretation  w hich  can m ost fairly be said to be 
im b ed d ed  in the statute, in the sense o f  be ing  m ost h a rm on ious  with its schem e an d  with general 
pu rp o ses  tha t C ongress  m anifested .) ;  New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bowers, 34 F.2d 60 (1929). (Fair 
in terpre ta tion  o f  statute often requires  that one  provis ion  be read broadly  enough  to conflict with  and 
overr ide  ano the r  ); Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 103 S.Ct. 986  ( 1983). (In case o f  
s ta tu tory  construction , task is to interpret w ords o f  s tatute in light o f  pu rp o ses  C ongress  sough t to 
serve.); U. S. v. Wise, 82 S.Ct. 1354 (1962). (L egis la tive  h is tory  m ay be exam ined  to ascertain intent 
o f  C o n g ress  as to u ltim ate  pu rp o se  o f  a statute.); Flora v. U.S., 80 S.Ct. 630  (1960). (Frequently , the 
leg isla tive h is tory  o f  a s ta tu te  is the m ost fruitful source  o f  instruction as to the  p roper  interpretation o f  
the statute.); U.S. v. Public Utilities Commission o f  Cal., 73 S.Ct. 706  (1953). (W here  language and 
p u rp o se  o f  ques t ioned  s ta tu te  is clear, courts  fo llow  legislative d irection in interpretation, bu t where 
w o rd s  are am b ig u o u s  o r  w o u ld  b r ing  about an end com ple te ly  at var iance  with purpose  o f  statute i f  
literally  construed , ju d ic ia ry  m ay  properly  use legislative h is tory  to reach conclusion.); Trailmobile 
Co. V . Whirls, 67 S.Ct. 982 (1947), (The in terpretation  o f  statutes cannot safely rest upon changes 
m ade  in C ongress iona l  com m ittee  w ithou t  exp lana tion  ); Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers 
A ss ’n, 88 S.Ct. 643 ( 1968). (C ongress iona l labor and public lands legislation is often produc t o f  
confl ic t  and  co m p ro m ise  between strongly  held and opposed  view s, and  its p roper construction 
frequen tly  requires  considera t ion  o f  its w o rd ing  against  the b ack g ro u n d  o f  its legislative history and in 
light o f  genera l  ob jec tives  C ongress  sought to ach ieve  (em phasis  added));  Shell Oil Co. v. Iowa Dept, 
o f  Revenue, 109 S.Ct. 278  (1988). (In constru ing  m ean in g  o f  statute, court  does not usually  accord 
m u ch  w eig h t  to s ta tem ents  o f  bill 's  o pponen ts  con ta ined  in legisla tive h is tory  ); United Steelworkers o f  
America, AFL-CIO-CLC  v. Weber, 99 S.Ct. 2721 ( 1979). (A  th ing  m ay  be within the letter o f  the 
s ta tu te  and  yet no t w ith in  the statute, because  not w ith in  its spirit no r  w ith in  the intention o f  its 
m akers .)
16 u s e  ÿ 1131(a) & 16 USC ÿ 1133(b) & (c).
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must be measured and sure, for the cost of failure could be an even more secure 
foothold for mining in wilderness.
B. Administrative Reform
Another avenue for Wilderness Act reform could be through administrative, 
or executive, action. Only three options really exist in this forum: first, enact new 
management regulations further restricting mining in wilderness, but falling short of 
contravening the current interpretation o f  Congress’s intent to allow mining; second, 
enact new regulations governing the mining industry as a whole, such as reasonable 
royalty payments, stricter reclamation requirements, etc.; and third, unilateral action 
by the President to circumnavigate the difficulties presented by wilderness 
designation and the shortcomings o f  the Wilderness Act (e.g., use the Antiquities Act 
of 1906 to create National Monuments where mining is not allowed at all). However, 
none o f  these administrative efforts to curtail mining offer a bulletproof solution to 
the current Rock Creek Mine situation or the conundrum presented by “valid existing 
rights” to mining claims all across the country. However, each offers opportunities to 
eliminate, or severely restrict, new exploration for minerals on our public lands, and 
stricter regulations on mining in wilderness, or in general, could have a chilling effect 
on existing mineral claim development.
It should be mentioned though the political realities surrounding these options 
are somewhat troublesome. First and foremost, the permanence o f administrative 
action can be fleeting at times. An action by a pro-preservation administration can be 
undone by a subsequent pro-mining administration only a few short years later.
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Specific efforts for the reforms mentioned above can be found in the near past, and 
while most have survived the years since, some have been subsequently undone.
To highlight this problem of permanence, when President Clinton, using his 
powers under the Antiquities Act, created the Grand Staircase-Escalante National 
Monument, his unilateral preservation efforts raised such an uproar that Congress 
tried, in vain fortunately, to restrict or eliminate the President’s powers under the 
Antiquities Act.'"*  ̂ Further, efforts by Interior Secretary Babbit in 2000 to 
substantively reform mining laws through changes to the BLM ’s mining 
regulations'*^* were subsequently re-amended in 2001, and rendered largely 
ineffective, by the subsequent, pro-mining Interior Secretary, Gale Norton.
The only examples o f  permanence in administrative or executive action to preserve 
wilderness qualities are found in the alternative designation efforts by the President 
and agencies. To date, no effort to undo a Presidential declaration o f a National 
Monument has succeeded, going all the way back to Teddy Roosevelt’s designations 
a hundred years ago.
Similarly, designations such as National Conservation or Recreation Areas 
have also proven themselves to stand up to the test of time. Typically, however. 
National Monuments have failed to provide any additional protections against 
encroachment by mining interests with valid pre-existing rights. Considering these 
are the mining interests currently jeopardizing the CMW  and are also the only mining 
interests currently able to mine in wilderness anywhere, one has to wonder how
Jam es R. Rasband, U tah's G rand Staircase: The R ight Path to W ilderness P reserva tio n ^  70 U. of 
Col. L. Rev. 483, 530-34 (Spring 1999).
65 Federal Register 69998-01 (11 /21/2000).
66 Federal Register 54834-01 ( 10/30/2001).
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effective any of these alternative designations have really been when they are all 
made “subject to valid existing rights” .
C  Legislative Reform
The most permanent reforms to the Wilderness Act will come out of 
legislative actions either amending the original Act itself or designating new 
wilderness with language readdressing congressional intent on the mining issue. The 
first o f  these two options will be the most difficult politically. Once a bill is proposed 
to amend the Wilderness Act, it is like opening Pandora’s Box. After the amendment 
leaves the hands o f  the Congressman who proposed it, it is totally out of his/her 
control as to how the bill will be reshaped by the time it makes it to a floor vote. 
Actually, the bill needs to survive two floor votes and, if the House of 
Representatives and Senate pass two different versions of the same bill, a Conference 
Committee will further amend the proposed bill to reconcile differences between the 
two versions.'^**
The likelihood o f  a bill as controversial as one amending Wilderness Act to 
the disfavor of the mining lobby making it through the legislative process without 
being largely undone is highly unlikely. A more realistic possibility might be to 
legislate new wilderness in due course and provide for the elimination of all mining 
claims within that designated area, including valid existing claims, and either through
Elliot &  M etcalf ,  Supra  N ote  !32 at p. 486. C iting  - 119 C ong. Rec. H 1381 (daily  edition  M arch 5, 
1973)(R em arks  o f  Rep. B urton);  1 19 C ong. Rec. S3245 (daily  ed. Feb. 26, 1973) (R em arks  ot Sen. 
Jackson );  1 19 C ong . Rec. s l 5 6 7 7  (daily ed. Aug, 3, 1973) (R em ark s  o f  Sen. MetcalfJ; 121 Cong. Rec. 
H I 33 (daily  ed. Jan. 14, 1975) (R em arks  o f  Rep. H eckler); 117 C ong. Rec. 15512 (M ay 1971) 
R em ark s  o f  Sen. P ackw ood);  121 Cong. Rec. E l  137 (daily  ed. Mar. 13, 1975) (R em arks  o f  Re. 
D ingell) .  {All rem arks com m ented on num erous p roposed  bills to elim inate the m ining exception in 
wilderness).
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committee reports or the language o f  the bill itself, effectively amend the Wilderness 
Act’s exemptions for mining in wilderness.
An example o f  this ex post facto  amendment o f the Wilderness Act occurred 
in 1980. In enacting the Colorado Wilderness Act, Congress finalized formal 
congressional intent through a House Report referring to mandatory grazing 
guidelines for managing livestock grazing in wilderness.'^' However, it should be 
noted. Congress’s intent on certain issues pertaining to wilderness grazing was rather 
unclear, so there was a reason for the indirect amendment. Also, the Colorado 
Wilderness Act’s reform of grazing guidelines within wilderness was no surprise to 
interested parties engaged in the debate. One would be hard pressed to sneak a new 
wilderness bill through Congress with the intent o f eliminating valid mining claims in 
wilderness with no opposition.
Another possibility would be for a senator to attach a Wilderness Act 
amendment as a rider to a law of critical importance to the current administration. 
Introduced as a congressional rider, a Wilderness Act reform bill might be able to 
largely avoid floor debate and the damaging amendment process, but there are still no 
guarantees it will survive the lawmaking process.
Mitchel P. McCIaran, Livestock in IVildeniess: A R eview  and Forecast, 20 Environmental Law 857, 
871 (1990).
- http://clubs.arizona.edu/~elfforum/Articles/sp9710.htin. “A rider is an addendum to a bill or an act 
o f  Congress, attached to that bill for different reasons. Generally the bill or act is so important that for 
political reasons the President cannot veto it, and the act is signed into law, prior to which there is no 
debate as to the legality or validity o f  the specific effects o f  the rider itself. For example, in 1995 
Clinton was forced to sign the Budget Rescissions Act after the government was shut down for the 
second time for lack o f  a feasible national budget. The President, at that time, was under intense 
pressure from the public to pass the Appropriations Act. Because o f  that political pressure, he was 
forced to sign the bill without modification or opportunity to veto. Unfortunately, attached to that bill 
was a rider allowing logging to begin in National Forests. Although this rider had nothing to do w ith 
the actual issue o f  the national budget, it went into effect with that new budget and in the process, 
exempted the logging from a multitude o f  environmental laws. Without any debate on either floor of
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In any event, an attempt to amend the Wilderness Act, directly or indirectly, 
would create an instantaneous firestorm likely to destroy even the most earnest 
attempts. Furthermore, even if a measure did pass through Congress, on a rider for 
instance, Congress would still have to appropriate additional funds to the managing 
agencies to deal with a law creating regulatory takings claims for a large number of 
private property interests holding mining claims within wilderness. Consequently, 
the whole process could be stopped even before it got off the ground due to 
appropriations issues related to the purchase of all those valid mining claims.
D. Valid Existing Rights and the Takings Claim
A long-standing legal history would bolster any takings claims made by a 
patented or unpatented holder o f valid mining claims in wilderness. If  the federal 
government was to do anything to eliminate the “reasonable investment backed 
expectations” o f mining claimholders through judicial, administrative, or legislative 
action, the government must be ready, willing, and able to compensate those 
possessing said private property i n t e r e s t s . W i t h o u t  going into the specifics of 
takings law, all one needs to know is when a patented private property interest in 
previously public land has been created, the government cannot take it away without 
just compensation to the injured party.
Unfortunately, the amount the government must pay is not what the private 
party paid to the government for the property but the amount the private party expects
Congress, private business interests and their lobbying groups thwarted environmental and tribal 
protection laws in order to plunder our national forests and public lands 'for profit,”
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City o f  N ew  York, 98 S.Ct. 2646 ( 1978).
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to profit from the public land.'^^ Typically, mining interests have been able to patent 
their mining claims for very little money. In fact, mineral interests have only had to 
pay the government five dollars per acre for patents, a ridiculously small amount 
dating back to 1872 with the passage of the General Mining Law.’ ’^
Nevertheless, the government must pay the mining interest what it expects to 
make in profits from mining its claims. In the case of the Rock Creek Mine, Sterling 
Mining Co. projects the mine to produce 300 million ounces o f silver and two billion 
pounds o f  copper, resulting in significant gross p r o f i t . W h a t  the net profit would 
be is much harder to determine, but factors such as mine development and 
reclamation costs must be included to offset gross profit projections. In any event, it 
will cost the federal government a lot o f money to buy out the Rock Creek Mine 
claims from Sterling Mining Company. But more importantly, neither the Forest 
Service nor the BLM has the funds or the mandate to pursue such a buyout. This is 
not to say it has never been done. In 1996, President Clinton authorized 65 million 
dollars to buyout the Crown Butte gold mine along the Yellowstone National Park 
border.'^®
Seeing the problems presented by this situation, one possible route for mining 
reform in wilderness is to change the mandates and appropriations schemes for the 
Forest Service and BLM in managing wilderness to mimic those for the NPS. The 
NPS has already bought out several mining claims within its jurisdiction during its
John D. Leshy, The Babbit Legacy at the Dept, o f  the Interior: A Prelim inary View. 3 1 
Environmental Law 199, 223 (2001 ).
http://www.sterlingminingcompany.com/'index.cfm?page=rockcreek.cfm. 
http://www2.nature.nps.gov/YearInReview/yr_r\'vv97/chapter01/to_chapter0l_a01.htm l.
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history o f  wilderness m a n a g e m e n t . T h e  only issues stopping the Forest Service 
and BLM from doing so are: specific mandates preventing either agency from 
exercising the power o f  condemnation;'^*^ and the lack o f  funding for such purchases 
short o f  specific congressional approval to do so with appropriations included.'*’' 
Consequently, if  the agencies were given the power o f condemnation, with a public 
review process included, as an additional tool in making management decisions, it is 
possible the Rock Creek Mine would not open. Although, it should be mentioned, 
there is a controversial case history behind the legal precept o f  the agencies affecting 
a regulatory taking without specific statutory authority.'^"
These agencies cuiTcntly manage their jurisdictions using an “integrated 
resource” analysis to catalog resource extraction and recreational opportunities 
available on all their inventoried l a n d s . I t  would not seem an unreasonable change 
in policy to include the power of condemnation, or eminent domain, to preclude 
development of mining claims in areas with high wilderness value through forced 
land exchanges or buyouts, thereby returning said claims to the public domain. 
Unfortunately, if  these changes are brought about at the administrative level, they can 
always be amended and undone by subsequent, pro-mining administrations, not to 
mention a lack o f  Congressional mandate for doing so.
’ Jo h n  C. H en d ee  & C h ad  P. D aw son , Wilderness M anagem ent: Stew ardship and Protection oj 
R esources and Values, i " '  Edition. Page 1 14 (F u lc rum  P ub lish ing  2002).
(F o res t  Service)  16 U S C  § 1134(c) & (B L M ) 43 C F R  6305.11.
Id.
For m ore  inform ation on the constitu tional issues su rround ing  the use o f  regulatory  takings for 
w ild e rn ess  m anagem en t,  p lease  see: Susan M. Stedfast, R egula to iy  Takings: A H istorical O verview  
a nd  L ega l A nalysis fo r  N atural Resource M anagem ent, 29 E nv ironm en ta l  Law  S81 (W in ter  1999). 
h t t p : / / w w w . f s . fed ,us/im /directives/fsiW  1900/1920 .t.xt.; 43 C F R  § 2420.1.
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Legislative amendments to the Wilderness Act and FLPMA would be the only 
way to ensure permanence for such a change. Currently, section 1134(c) of the 
Wilderness Act expressly forbids the Forest Service from using condemnation in 
dealing with private holders of valid existing property rights. FLPMA, the BLM ’s 
statutory authority for wilderness preservation, does not authorize the use of eminent 
domain except for maintaining adequate access over private land to its public land 
holdings. Both o f these statutes present opportunities to create the power of 
eminent domain for use in extinguishing mining claims specifically in wilderness.
A corollary issue likely to arise is how the agencies are to reach a decision 
exercising eminent domain powers to condemn a mining claim. Currently, buyout 
options are often considered in the NEPA process when actions by either agency to 
allow development o f  mining claims, hand out grazing permits, or proceed with the 
sale o f  logging leases occur in ecologically sensitive areas likely to give rise to public 
opposition.'®^ The Kootenai National Forest considered a buyout option more than 
once for the Rock Creek Mine, but the mining interests refused.'®®
How exactly this eminent domain power proposal would work for the Rock 
Creek Mine in the CBW brings up an interesting question since only 101 out o f 133 
o f Sterling Mining Company’s claims are located inside of the wilderness
"'■'43 U S C  ÿ 1715.
11.5 http://\v\vw.pubiic!andsrancliing .org . ' 'h tm lres/buyoutJ e g i s _ a n n o ta te d .h tm . (D eta il ing  legislation 
au tho riz ing  a vo lun ta ry  buyou t p rogram  for g razing  perm it ho lders  on bo th  B L M  and Forest Service 
land.); h t tp : / /w w w .u tah tru s t lands .com /pdfs /po lic ie s /9701 .pd f  (D escr ib ing  Utah School Trust Land 
E.xchanges w ith  the B L M , p e r  vo luntary  agreem ent with  the U tah S c h o o l’s B oard  o f  Trustees , after the 
crea tion  o f  the G rand  S ta ircase-E scalan te  N ational M onum ent);
h ttp :/ /w w w .heartland .org /A rtic le .cfm '.^artId=14170 (D eta il ing  n um erous  legisla ti \  e and  adm in is tra t i \  e 
efforts  to b u y o u t  private  property  rights  o f  all k inds through n um erous  m an ag em en t  agencies.)
John  M cK ay ,  personal c o in  ersation with au thor  on .^pril 28, 2004.
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boundaiy.“’̂  Currently, the Forest Service and BLM manage wilderness within the 
context o f  larger areas, but the agencies are not allowed to manage for wilderness 
buffer zones. This creates a conundrum of attempting to utilize an amendment to the 
Wilderness Act granting eminent domain power to condemn patented property rights 
outside of a wilderness boundary.
From a legal standpoint, my proposed amendment to the Wilderness Act 
would not confer eminent domain powers to the agencies for lands outside o f  the 
wilderness boundary, so one o f  two things could happen: 1. The effect of a managing 
agencies use of eminent domain inside the wilderness boundary could render a 
mining operation no longer profitable and either a voluntary buyout ensues for the 
remaining claims outside the boundary or the mining interest chooses to hold onto the 
remaining claims outside the boundary until they become profitable to extract; or 2. 
The remaining claims outside the wilderness boundary are still profitable for 
extraction and the mine opens anyways.
Technical issues aside, considerations o f cost and availability of funds would 
have to be a major part o f any agency decision to exercise eminent domain. The 
funding aspect o f this proposal is its weakest link, but also gives it a reasonable flavor 
by allowing for a balancing o f  all considerations and interests involved. The problem 
with the current situation is the inability, should the claimholder refuse, o f  the 
managing agencies to buyout a mining claim if they choose buyout as the best option. 
Therefore, granting the agencies the power o f eminent domain in the interest of 
preservation, along with making its use accountable to the public and Congress as
S upra  N o te  89 at p. 31.
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with most agency actions, seems the most reasonable and effective way to resolve the 
mining in wilderness debate.
Conclusion
While there are many opportunities to refonn the Wilderness Act’s internal 
contradictions pertaining to mining in wilderness, they are all fraught with danger and 
difficulty. The issue seems a big hornets’ nest waiting to be stirred up into the largest 
public lands debate in our time. Historically, even the weakest reforms to further 
protect any public lands from mining have been met with fierce resistance, so 
something as symbolic as totally shutting out the mining interests from any public 
lands designation is likely to bring the full wrath o f the mining lobby’s influence in 
Washington.
The important question is where does this leave us; is there any way to 
eliminate mining in wilderness? The short answer would seem to be “no”. But, upon 
reflection, a deeper look into the nuances o f the progress made in protecting the 
public lands from resource extraction, timing has always been a big factor in breeding 
success versus failure. In timing one’s efforts for public lands reform, one is able to 
combine the influences of public support, political sympathy, and the momentum 
necessary to effect such a sweeping change as eliminating valid mining claims in 
wilderness.
The public support could come from the Rock Creek Mine’s failure to keep its 
promise to not pollute the Clark Fork River and Lake Pend Oreilles. The political 
sympathy could come from the Kerry administration, should he be elected, and better 
yet, a democrat controlled Congress, although even with such a political situation
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there are still no guarantees. If  both the political support and sympathy are found, the 
momentum will surely follow. In timing lies the ever-changing combination of 
factors that, throughout history, in many different ways, have served to bring the 
winds o f change into our otherwise stagnant political process and effect real reforms 
when they seem most badly needed.
People care about preserving what little untouched nature still exists out there, 
they just need to be reminded of the fact every now and then. Unfortunately, to build 
this momentum sacrifices must be made; and the Rock Creek Mine may be one of 
those sacrifices; efforts for reform may be too late for the CMW. But if wilderness 
elsewhere can be better protected elsewhere in the future, perhaps it is worth the loss. 
If nothing good comes o f it, then shame on us.
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